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FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE ERIE-BYRD RULE
Richard W. Bournet
From theirfirst year in law school through their careers, attorneys have been mystffed by the twists andturns of the Erie doctrine and the seemingly incompatible unfolding of what Judge
Friendly labeled the "new federal common law." The author
attempts afresh reconciliation through a review of both bodies
of law. He concludes that in areasnot directly covered by either
the Constitution or ederal statutes,federal courts are authorized to resolve con icts betweenfederal and state rules through
application of a ederal proceduralcommon law in much the
same way that t ey have worked to resolve conflicts with state
policy in areas offederal substantive concern.

I.

INTRODUCTION
In overruling Swift v. Tyson' in 1938, Justice Brandeis' majority

opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 2 proclaimed: "[E]xcept in

matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State .... There is

no federal general common law."'3 The words were scarcely uttered,
however, before the same Justice, writing for another majority, was applying federal common law as the rule of decision in a case defining the
water rights of various states under an interstate compact.' In the years
that followed, the Supreme Court spawned an enormous body of case
law under the aegis of the Erie doctrine, while at the same time giving
flower to an extremely variegated body of specialized federal common
law.5
t B. A., Harvard College, 1964; LL.B., University of Virginia School of Law, 1968;
LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1975; Attorney, Department of Justice, 1968-73;
Teaching Fellow, Harvard Law School, 1973-75; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School, 1975-79; Associate Professor of Law, University
of Baltimore School of Law. The author wishes to thank many colleagues, particularly Professor John C. McCoid of the University of Virginia and Professor Eugene J. Davidson of the University of Baltimore, for their comments and
criticisms. These people deserve credit for much of what is good in the article,
and bear no responsibility for the rest.
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The literature of Erie is vast. The author believes that the
most significant recent contributions to this literature are Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) and Redish & Phillips, Erie and the
Rules of Decision Act." In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV.
356 (1977). The central theses of these articles are evaluated and criticized, respectively, at infra notes 158-85 and 256-76.
3. 304 U.S. at 78 (emphasis added).
4. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
5. A number of writers have discussed the new federal common law at length. See,
e.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Friendly]; Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts.- Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024
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A number of commentators have sought to reconcile the apparent
antagonism of these two trends. Professor Wright, for example, suggests the "two simultaneous developments are probably more than co-7
incidental." 6 Perhaps the most important effort is Judge Friendly's.
In his view, the Erie jettison of Swft, made necessary because of the
unconstitutionality of general federal lawmaking under the tenth
amendment, 8 created a need for a body of federal judge-made law
which could provide uniform rules on issues of national concern and
thereby minimize the centrifugal forces of American federalism.9 By
focusing federal judges on the appropriate doctrinal sources of national
power, Erie opened the door to "a federal decisional law in areas of
national concern that is truly uniform because, under the supremacy
clause, it is binding on every forum . ... "10
The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between
this kind of federal common law and the Erie doctrine." It seeks to
reconcile Erie and the new federal common law by making the former
a specialized branch of the latter. The argument proceeds through
three stages. First, there will be a descriptive analysis of federal common law of the non-Swtfi variety before and after Erie. The cases suggest judicial willingness to apply federal judge-made law, as opposed to
local rules of decision, in areas where the sovereign interests of the federal government are exclusive or at least appear paramount. Increasingly this has occurred in zones of activity heavily influenced by federal
regulatory legislation. Under the influence, though not the command,

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

(1967) [hereinafter cited as Hill]; Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw'"
Competence and Discretion of the Choice of National and Slate Rules of Decision,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin]; Note, The Federal
Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note].
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 282 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
See Friendly, supra note 5.
Id at 394-98. However, it is this writer's opinion that more than the tenth amendment was involved. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
See Friendly, supra note 5, at 421. Judge Friendly calls the new federal common
law "a new centripetal tool incalculably useful to our federal system." Id
Id at 405.
At the outset, the author would like to note substantial agreement with Judge
Friendly's view. His position, briefly, is that:
[t]he coincidence of the death of the first (Swi) doctrine and the growth
of the second (new federal common law) would itself suggest that Swift
...had retarded the development of federal decisional law of the latter
type. .

.

. Since most cases relating to federal matters were in the fed-

eral courts and involved "general" law, the familiar rule of Swif? . . .
usually gave federal judges all the freedom they required in pre-Erie
days and made it unnecessary for them to consider a more esoteric
source of power . . . . By focusing judicial attention on the nature of
the right being enforced, Erie caused the principle of a specialized federal common law, binding all courts because of its source, to develop
within a quarter century into a powerful unifying force.
Id at 407 (citations omitted). Friendly's argument is at most a limited one, a sort
of "necessity-is-the-mother-of-invention" approach.
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of federal positive law, the federal courts have fashioned national rules
in such a way as to preempt large areas of activity from state regulation. At the same time, due regard for state interests has on occasion
led to the incorporation of local law as the federal rule of decision in
particular cases.
The second stage of the analysis involves the operation of the Erie
doctrine as it has unfolded since 1938. As with federal common law
generally, in this area the federal courts have tended to apply federal
law when it was believed that there was a legitimate federal interest in
doing so. This is true not only on questions directly governed by provisions of federal positive law, but also on issues indirectly influenced by
federal legislation or otherwise believed to be exclusively beyond the
ken of state lawmaking. The seminal case authorizing the latter development is Byrd v. Blue Ridge RuralElectric Cooperative,Inc. , 2 decided
twenty years after Erie. Even after Byrd, however, when there appears
to be little or no independent federal interest in applying a federal rule
of decision, the Erie-Byrd cases have demonstrated a willingness to
adopt state law and policies as the rule of decision, particularly when
failure to do so would undermine a significant state policy.
The message of the new federal common law cases is that in areas
of exclusive or predominate federal substantive concern, federal law
should provide the controlling rule of decision. It follows that in areas
of exclusive or predominant federal procedural concern, federal law
may also govern. While it is proper and useful to recognize the applicability of much of the teaching of the new federal common law cases
to Erie-Byrd problems, one must be mindful that in the latter area the
adjective nature of procedural law frequently requires restraint in defining federal policies and the circumstances in which they should be
applied. The final stage of the discussion therefore turns to how federal
and state interests should be accommodated in those cases where federal judge-made procedural rules conflict with state rules, both procedural and substantive.
II.

FEDERAL COMMON LAW

A.

The Pre-Erie Lines

In the era before Erie and in addition to the ill-starred cases falling
under Swift v. Tyson, 13 federal judges fashioned federal rules of decision in a number of contexts. First, they did so by filling in the meaning of vague provisions of federal positive law' 4 and by fashioning
12. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
13. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14. See, e.g., United States Mortgage Co. v. Matthews, 293 U.S. 232, 236 (1934) (in
evaluating emergency mortgage relief statute against mortgagee claims that statute offends impairment clause, Court applied independent federal standards for
defining scope of agreement); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 500-02 (1897)

19831

Erie-Byrd Rule

remedies for which federal law provided rights and obligations. 1 5 In
these areas the federal courts were arguably only construing legislative
materials produced by other institutions of government; certainly they
could look to these materials to anchor and thus legitimate their decisions. While there was no question that in using the methodologies of
common law courts to construe legislation the federal judiciary was not
utilizing extra-judicial powers, their decisions nevertheless smack of
common law in the sense that they were "making" law, albeit in ways
clearly within their delegated authority.' 6
Second, there were a number of decisions in which federal courts
made law in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative commands.' 7 This has been true, for example, in those areas in which federal courts were vested with exclusive jurisdiction to decide certain
claims but were afforded little or no legislative guidance as to how to
decide them.' 8 In each of these areas federal judges have sometimes

15.
16.

17.

18.

(in applying the Constitution's impairment clause to state contracts authorizing
lottery sales federal, not state law, determines whether a contract exists).
See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (the foundation of the exclusionary rule cases in which a federal remedy was developed to enforce the
fourth amendment).
See D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson explains that:
The federal courts have no general common law as in a sense they have
no general or comprehensive jurisprudence of any kind, because many
subjects of private law which bulk large in the traditional common law
are ordinarily within the province of the states and not of the federal
government. But this is not to say that wherever we have occasion to
decide a federal question which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone we may not resort to all of the source materials of the common law, or that when we have fashioned an answer it does not become
a part of the federal non-statutory or common law ...
Were we bereft of the common law, our federal system would be
impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting allcomplete statutory codes and is apparent from the terms of the Constitution itself....
1d at 469-70 (emphasis in original).
Consider, for example, the line of cases authorizing the federal government to sue
to redress grievances against it without a statutory grant of standing to do so.
Eg., Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (II How.) 229 (1850) (federal government
may sue to protect its property rights like any other corporation); In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895) (federal government has standing to seek injunction against Pullman railway strike because of pecuniary interests in uninterrupted mail service,
the federal interest in eliminating nationwide nuisance, and the governmental
need to relieve unreasonable impediment to flow of interstate commerce).
For interstate dispute cases which support this proposition see, e.g., Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). For admiralty and maritime decisions see, e.g., Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917). For bankruptcy proceedings which lend support to this theory
see, e.g., Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939); James v. Gray,
131 F. 401 (1st Cir. 1904).
The United States Constitution vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction to hear "Controversies between two or more States .... between a State
and Citizens of another State . ..and between a State . . .and foreign States,
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adopted a federal common law rule in such a way as to displace a competing state rule of decision. When a federal rule was applied in this
way, it was given the same force as a rule emanating from Congress
and was held enforceable in the state as well as federal courts.' 9 This
did not make state law completely irrelevant to the process; occasionally due regard for an important local policy would lead the federal
court to consider or adopt local law as the rule of decision.2"
Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Under 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (1976
& Supp. V 1981), the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over suits
by one State against another. Congress has provided the district courts with original jurisdiction, exclusive of the state courts, in admiralty and bankruptcy cases.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1334 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
One could argue that in cases of exclusive federal jurisdiction, necessity requires the use of federal common law in the absence of other sources of rules for
decision. Note, however, that issues in these fields may arise in areas where the
jurisdiction is concurrent, rather than exclusive, thus vitiating the necessity rationale. Realizing this, scholars have developed other reasons for the use of federal
common law. See, e.g., Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 489, 531-32 (1954) (inability of states to fashion comprehensive
set of rights and remedies because of quasi-exclusive grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal court justifies implying congressional grant of power to federal
courts to develop national common law under saving to suitors clause); Henkin,
The ForeignAffairs Power ofthe FederalCourts - Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
805, 817 (1964) (unfairness of judging acts by interested states' rules justifies neutral federal common law in interstate dispute cases); Hill, supra note 5, at 1025,
1031-68 (constitutional preemption authorizes federal common law in interstate
and maritime dispute areas as well as in areas where federal proprietary interests
or problems of international law are implicated); Note, supra note 5, at 1520-21
(concept of national sovereignty requires ability to avoid internal conflicts threatening rupture and to face other nations in a uniform way, thus justifying interstate
dispute and foreign affairs cases).
19. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Chelentis v. Lukenbach
S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
20. See, e.g., Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (federal practice of applying a rule of literal compliance with marine insurance policy
relaxed in favor of application of differing state practice, in view of paramount
state interest in regulating insurance); Sultan R.R. & Timber Co. v. Department
of Labor and Indus., 277 U.S. 135 (1928) (state may award workmen's compensation to worker on navigable river, despite inconsistency with general admiralty
law, when employment was stationary and issues were essentially "local" in character); Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942) ("The court of
bankruptcy is a court of equity. . . and it is for that court - not without appropriate regard for rights acquired under rules of state law - to define and apply
federal law in determining the extent to which the inequitable conduct of a claimant . . . in bankruptcy requires . . . subordination to other claims.
Id at
95).
The notion that a federal court should give due regard to rights created under
state law in determining the reach of federal law, common or statutory, is of
course not novel. See, e.g., De Sylvia v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (state
interest in regulating domestic relations requires incorporation of state rule of inheritance to illegitimate offspring into federal statute providing for renewal of
copyright by "children" of deceased author); Mason v. United States, 260 U.S.
545 (1923) (measure of damages for conversion of oil from government land determined under local law); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1877) (when government takes property from a person who lacks good title under state law, it obtains
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The "new" federal common law heralded by Judge Friendly and
other commentators has its roots in this pre-Erie body of law. Although Erie did away with the ability of federal courts to fashion "general common law" in diversity cases, so as to displace state common
(and occasionally statutory) law, 2 1 it did not seriously affect the bankruptcy, admiralty, and interstate dispute lines of cases.
1. Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy, the changes after Erie were more formal than real.
The post-Erie jurisprudence required a reformulation of the doctrinal
basis offered in favor of application of federal standards in the face of
contrary state created rights. The old tendency to justify reordering of
creditor priorities on the basis of "general law" or "equity jurisprudence" was believed no longer appropriate; the same decisions could
now only be rationalized under the bankruptcy statutes.2 2 The problem remained, however, of what to do when the statutes themselves
were silent. As these cases illustrate, federal judges continued to render
nugatory state created rights, however this was now done in the name
of furthering the "policy of the Bankruptcy Act."2 3 The change in formulation should not obscure the similarity of result; the decisions subsequent to Erie were consistent with those before it.24
2.

Admiralty

A somewhat similar but more twisted pattern emerged in the admiralty cases. Here, prior to Erie, it was believed that the federal common lawmaking power arose from a need for a nationally uniform
body of maritime law.25 The most interesting early cases involved

21.

22.
23.
24.

25.

no better title than its grantor, otherwise important vested rights would be
destroyed).
Professor Horwitz cites Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 521 (1855),
Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 598-99 (1855), and Oates v. National Bank,
100 U.S. 239, 246, 249 (1879) for the proposition that prior to Erie the Supreme
Court sometimes "bluntly declared that state statutes had to yield before the 'general commercial law'; in many other cases the federal courts simply refused to be
bound by an anticommercial state court 'interpretation' of its own statute." M.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 250 (1977).
For an extensive treatment of this subject see Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1953).
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 162 (1946).
Compare American Surety Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133
(1935) (a pre-Erie case where the power to subordinate claims was found in the
Court's general equity power) with Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (a postErie case grounding the Court's authority to subordinate claims in the Bankruptcy Act).
Professor Currie expounds the uniformity argument in Currie, Federalism and the
Admiralty." "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158. The views of Justice Story can be found in DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)
(No. 3776). See Stevens, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARv. L. REV. 246 (1950). At least one commentator, however, has
used an argument based on the twin theories of necessity and constitutional pre-
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whether federal common law should supercede state law regarding the
navigable waters within the states. In 1917, the Supreme Court held in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen26 that the national need for uniform
rules of liability in unseaworthiness cases within the maritime jurisdiction (at that time largely undeveloped by Congress or the federal
courts) compelled a kind of federal preemption which barred a state
court from awarding workmen's compensation damages for wrongful
death to a longshoreman who was accidentally killed on the navigable
waters of a state. 27 Although statutory changes 28 and Supreme Court
decisions 29 suggest that the particular result in Jensen might no longer
hold today, 3 ° the uniformity doctrine of federal preemption is still alive
and well. '
3. Interstate Disputes
The tradition that federal courts may fashion federal common law
to determine rights and obligations in cases involving interstate disputes is an old one,32 and is supported by arguments closely resembling
the necessity and functional justifications in admiralty.3 3 If anything

26.
27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.
33.

emption to justify action in this area. Hill, supra note 5. The Supreme Court has
recently said, "We consistently have interpreted the grant of admiralty jurisdiction . . . as a proper basis for the development of judge-made rules of maritime
law." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S.
77, 95-96 (1981) (quoting Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21
(1963)).
244 U.S. 205 (1917).
Id at 216. In dissent, Justice Holmes emphasized the paucity of federal authority
in the area and castigated the court majority for imagining that "law is a brooding
omnipresence in the sky" to be divined by federal judges. Id at 222. (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
See 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1976) (compensation for injuries occurring on navigable waterways); 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1976) (exclusiveness of liability and remedy); 46 U.S.C.
§ 761 (1976) (providing a wrongful death action for families of seamen killed at
sea); 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976) (recovering for injury to or death of seamen); see also
Note, Fixing the Landward Coverage of the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 36 MD. L. REV. 851 (1977).
See Sea Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314
(1960); see also American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274 (1979) (plurality affirming the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals which allowed
plaintiff to amend a tort complaint alleging negligence and unseaworthiness to
add his spouse as a plaintiff for loss of society).
Almost certainly the Court will not again reach the precise result in Jensen, where
application of state law would have been more generous to the plaintiff had it
been allowed. 'Cf. Sun Ship Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980) (allowing
application of a state law which resulted in greater benefits accruing to the
plaintiff).
See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Kossick v. United
Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 731-42 (1961); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406,
409-10 (1953); see also Sea Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 577 (1974)
(a wrongful death case relying heavily on Moragne).
See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Note, What Rule of Decision Should
Control In Interstate Controversies, 21 HARV. L. REV. 132 (1907).
Professor Wright believes that "the Court, of necessity, has developed its own
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new has occurred after Erie, it is the marked increase in the willingness
of the federal judiciary to fashion federal common law in such a way as
to override state created rights.
Two leading cases come to mind. The first is Banco Nacionalde
Cuba v. Sabbatino." The dispute involved the proceeds of the sale of a
shipload of sugar which, prior to its delivery to New York, had been
expropriated in Cuba by a decree of the then-recognized Castro government.35 Both parties recognized that the result turned on whether
the act of state doctrine, which generally validates acts of recognized
foreign governments within their own territories to the extent those acts
are legal there,3 6 superceded general principles of international law,
which would suggest the illegality of the expropriation. If the state
courts were free to formulate their own views on this issue, and if the
Supreme Court was bound by Erie to follow the law of the state where
the federal district court sat, then the bank would lose. Conversely, if
the question was inherently federal, to be decided independent of Erie
considerations, the bank would win. The Supreme Court held squarely
for the bank.
Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan discussed the scope of the
act of state doctrine and the choice of law question at some length.
Erie, he said, was simply irrelevant to "an issue concerned with a basic
choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the
National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members
of the international community," which he found had to be "treated
body of law to govern [interstate conflict] questions, because of the obvious unsuitability of looking to the law of a particular state when two states are in dispute." WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 279. A significant student note suggests that the
manifest unfairness of judging acts of one state by another's law cannot be the
sole justification, since the Court has decided such cases on its own law even when
the two states' laws were identical. Note, supra note 5, at 1520 (citing Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669-71 (1931)). The student author instead has
opined that the basis for federal common law in this area lies in a fundamental
requirement of sovereignty over any federal union, "that it be able to avoid internal rupture by settling disputes among its component parts." Note, supra note 5,
at 1520. Judge Friendly goes a step further, saying that "the Constitution can well
be deemed to require that the federal courts should fashion law when the interstate nature of a controversy makes it inappropriate that the law of either state
should govern." See Friendly, supra note 5, at 408 n. 119.
34. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
35. The two parties were a bank, asserting the legality of the expropriation decree,
and claimants who, having purchased whatever title the original private owner
had held, argued the expropriation to be illegal. The case was filed in federal
district court under diversity jurisdiction.
36. The Court previously defined the doctrine as:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained
through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
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exclusively as an aspect of federal law."' 37 Foreign relations are a matter of exclusive concern to the national government, and a single uniform federal standard for answering questions which impact upon such
relations is necessary to avoid "divergent and perhaps parochial state
interpretations. ' 38 If, in dealing with these "uniquely federal"
concerns,
federal authority, in this instance this Court, orders the field
of judicial competence in this area for the federal courts, and
the state courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the
purposes behind the doctrine could be as effectively undermined as if there had been no federal pronouncement on the
subject.3 9
Justice Harlan did not argue that judicial application of the act of state
doctrine itself was constitutionally compelled. n Instead he believed
that, in the absence of acts by other branches of government, the matter
was for federal courts to determine. To buttress his argument that
there are "constitutional underpinnings"'" and indirect statutory support4 2 for the position that the question fell within an "enclave of federal judge-made law which binds the States,"4 3 Harlan cited a string of
constitutional and statutory provisions dividing responsibility for foreign relations among the national legislative, executive and judicial
branches and vesting federal courts with jurisdiction to deal with various issues of foreign relations." Under the influence (though certainly
37. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425.
38. Id This was particularly true of questions relating to the scope of the act of state
doctrine, the adoption of which Harlan found to be as much a function of separation of powers among the various branches of the national government in dealing
with foreign powers as it was of general international law. Id at 423-24. Subsequently, in Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Court held invalid a state
law barring a foreign national from inheriting property in that state, if his country
would not grant American citizens reciprocal rights, because it felt that the statute
might impair the effective exercise of American foreign policy by the President
and Congress.
39. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424.
40. Apparently Harlan believed that Congress could override a court-fashioned rule,
as it did subsequent to the Sabbatino decision. Congress immediately responded
to the Sabbatino decision by passing the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. The amendment forbade American courts from invoking
the act of state doctrine without executive prodding in any case based upon a
post-1958 confiscation in violation of "principles of international law." See 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976). The amendment had the desired effect because on
remand the statute was held retroactive and the bank's case dismissed. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967).
41. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
42. Id at 427 n. 25.
43. Id at 426.
44. Id at 427 n. 25. Harlan stated that "Various constitutional and statutory provisions indirectly support this determination, see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10;
art. II, §§ 2, 3; art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(2), (b)(l), (b)(3) (1976 & Supp. III.
1979); § 1332(a)(2) (1976); § 1333 (1976); §§ 1350-51 (1976 & Supp. III. 1979), by
reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations
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not at the command) of these provisions, which at most suggested the
federal interest in foreign relations and the delicacy of the separation of
powers issues that international questions can sometimes pose, Justice
Harlan "concluded that the scope of the act of state doctrine must be
determined according to federal law."4 5
Aside from these vague references to federal positive law, the
strongest precedential support Justice Harlan could find lay in "the
bodies of law applied between States over boundaries and in regard to
the apportionment of interstate waters."4 6 He cited Hinderlider v. La
PlataRiver & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,47 a suit between private parties
in which the Court had settled a water rights dispute by using federal
common law principles to construe an interstate compact regulating
water apportionment. In Harlan's view, Hinderlider implied that apportionment was a matter of federal law which the states may not undermine even when dealing with private parties.4 Similarly, he
reasoned that the issues arising from the act of state doctrine were intrinsically federal in nature.49 Thus Harlan concluded that federal law
alone would determine the scope of the act of state doctrine, holding
that the Cuban decree could not be challenged because to do so would
offend the Cuban government and could "interfere with negotiations
being carried on by the Executive Branch."5 0
The second interstate conflict case is Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.5'
Illinois invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to hear
claims against six different Wisconsin municipal agencies to obtain an
order abating the latters' pollution of Lake Michigan. An order of dismissal from the original jurisdiction docket was not possible unless the
state's claim "arose under" federal law52 and hence could be initially
filed in an appropriate federal district court for consideration. The
Supreme Court held that the action did arise under federal law.5 3

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

and indicating a desire to give matters of international significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions.
376 U.S. at 427 n. 25.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427.
Id at 426.
304 U.S. 92 (1938).
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427.
Id
Id at 432.
406 U.S. 91 (1972).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). In order to resolve the case this
way, the Court had to overrule dictum in a case decided the previous term, Ohio
v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (strongly suggesting that actions by states to abate interstate pollution did not arise under federal law. Id at
498 n. 3), and fashion a new federal common law of nuisance. None of the interstate dispute cases it cited was direct precedential authority for the novel proposition it was upholding. Closest in point were cases in which the Court had previously agreed to entertain, under its original jurisdiction, actions by a state to
enjoin pollution emanating from outside its borders. E.g., Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 280 (1901). The
main argument in these cases, however, was not choice of law, but whether the
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City of Milwaukee was an appropriate application of the reasoning
in the older interstate dispute cases. When a state is injured by another
state, or by people operating in it, the injured state needs a neutral
forum and a nonparochial body of law to protect it.54 The Court was
correct in opening the federal courts to the injured state and in allowing the judiciary to fashion federal law in the absence of Congressional action. Up to this point, City ofMilwaukee is merely an instance
of the application of the interstate dispute cases.
However, City of Milwaukee is potentially much broader than the
interstate dispute cases. To the extent that it is founded on the federal
interest in preventing water pollution and in developing nationally uniform standards for such prevention, the case might be cited as authority
for suits by private as well as public agencies and as protecting plaintiffs from water pollution of not only interstate waterways but also intrastate navigable streams. Indeed, these issues divided the circuit
courts after City of Milwaukee was decided."5 It seems clear, however,
Court should hear the suits. To this the Court had reluctantly acceded, because of
the relative defenselessness of the states should this alternative be barred:
When the States by their union made the forcible abatement of outside
nuisances impossible to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this court.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 104 (quoting Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)) (citations omitted). The Court did not view the original
jurisdiction suits as sufficient authority for what it was doing in City of Milwaukee,
perhaps because the necessity of applying federal law does not arise so directly in
nonoriginal jurisdiction cases. In any event, further support was derived from
cases in which the Court implied remedies for the violation of a federal statutory
right or had employed federal common law to construe interstate compacts. See,
e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957);
Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). Perhaps the most interesting support the Court found for its position lay in the existence of federal anti-pollution statutes and regulations. See City ofMilwaukee, 406
U.S. at 101-03. These statutes did not show legislative preemption of the field; on
the contrary, while in time they might be found to fill the legislative void, at that
time they were insufficient to define a plaintiffs rights or to provide him a remedy.
See id at 107-08. The Court offered the legislative background only to show a
federal legislative interest in the area adequate to preempt state lawmaking in the
area. Id The idea that the federal positive law might also preclude federal judges
from making law in the area seems not to have occurred to the Court; instead, it
used this legislation as a springboard for judicial action.
54. See supra note 33.
55. Compare National Sea Clammers Ass'n v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1980) (private actions authorized in view of broad federal interest in uniform
rules to protect national natural resources), rev'd sub nom. Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (comprehensive remedial scheme of statute preempts state courts from fashioning judge-made
remedies) with Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v.
Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (no private actions based on interests of state
governments and need to provide federal forum to preserve federalism interests
have been authorized since City of Milwaukee); see also Illinois v. Outboard
Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980) (state may sue in-state polluter for
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that the broad language of the original decision, particularly the repeated reference to the positive law background as evidence of a strong
national policy against water pollution, suggest the appropriateness of
a more sweeping federal common law of56nuisance than can be justified
under the interstate dispute cases alone.
On the other hand, Sabbaino's relationship to the interstate dispute cases is more attenuated. Justice Harlan's broad reading of Hinderlider is by no means required by the decision itself, which proceeds
at least as much from a need for a neutral federal forum to construe an
interstate document as it does from the broader policies ascribed to it
by his opinion. The decision gains justification from other sources,
chiefly the need for national uniformity in determining who speaks for
our government in foreign relations and the inextricable relationship
such questions have to the doctrine of separation of powers. The background of federal constitutional and statutory provisions indicating the
federal nature of these concerns, together with the obvious utility of
working out international problems according to a single set of standards, warranted a rule ensuring that federal agencies would use their
own standards to determine and implement national policy in the international sphere and to maintain the delicate balance among the
branches in the exercise of power over foreign relations matters. To
say that positive law commanded the final result in Sabbatino, however, is to go too far; there was nothing in either the Constitution or the
federal statutes remotely suggesting that the act of state doctrine
should, on the facts of the case, supercede general principles of international law. Yet the positive law, though lurking in the background, did
influence the result by making it clear that virtually all the issues the
conflict of these doctrines posed were intrinsically federal in nature.
The bankruptcy, admiralty, and interstate dispute cases were fountainheads of federal substantive common law before Erie overruled
Swft. Pre-Erie formulations in these areas, emphasizing background
legislative policies, national uniformity, and the need for federal preemption, foreshadowed continued development after the Erie decision.
In the post-Erie era, however, federal courts began expanding federal
polluting navigable but intrastate waters in order to assure application of uniform
rules of decision in protecting national natural resources); Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (federal common law not violated
when plaintiffs allege pollution of Lake Superior and air but fail to allege significant injury to persons or property in another state).
56. See Comment, FederalCommon Law ofPublic Nuisance. An ExpandingApproach
to Water Pollution Control, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 134 (1980). The commentator's
expansive view of City of Milwaukee, has, of course, been undercut by City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (holding that the 1972 Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, enacted shortly after the first City of Milwaukee case was
decided, had preempted the field in the regulation of interstate discharges of untreated sewage) and Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (comprehensive remedial scheme of statute
preempts courts from fashioning judge-made remedies).
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substantive law into entirely new areas. The discussion now turns to
the growth of this "new" federal common law.
B. Post-Erie Formulations
1. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States
Perhaps the best known of the "new federal common law" cases is
Clear6eldTrust Co. v. UnitedStates.5 A stolen and forged government
check was cashed at a bank, which guaranteed prior endorsements, and
was presented to the government for payment. The government sued
the bank on the guarantee, and the bank defended on the basis of government delay in giving notice of the theft. The Supreme Court refused to apply local law, under which the bank's defense was valid,
instead looking to the federal law merchant of an earlier era, under
which the government's recovery would be barred only if the bank
could demonstrate that the delay in notice clearly caused it injury.
This result was achieved through a three-step inquiry.5" First, the
Court had to decide whether the case involved federal interests sufficient to oust the direct application of Erie. The Court deemed Erie
irrelevant because of the manifest federal pecuniary interest involved
and because of the background of federal constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory rules which permeated the issues at stake. According to Justice Douglas' majority opinion, there was no question that the rights
and duties of the federal government flowing from its own commercial
paper were to be determined by federal rather than local law.5 9 The
second and third questions addressed both involved whether to apply
local law on the precise issue in question or to select a broad federal
rule. This involved determining what federal law should be and
whether it should be applied in contravention of local law. The Court
indicated that the desirability of a uniform rule governing the negotiability of federal issues made choice of variable local rules inappropriate.6" The Court then found the federal law merchant developed under
the aegis of Swift "a convenient source of reference" for fashioning
federal common law rules in the area."
The Clearfield answer to the choice of law issue has been justly
57. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
58. In his analysis of the case Judge Friendly incorporated the second and third questions into one. For him, the second question was whether, assuming a federal
court could formulate a rule of decision, it should do so by adopting a uniform
nationwide rule or follow state law. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 410.
59. Cleaoeld Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 366-67.
60. Douglas went on to say that:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale
and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly
occur in several states. The application of state law, even without the
conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of
the United States to exceptional uncertainty.
Id at 367.
61. Id at 367-68.
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criticized.62 At the time of the decision it was not clear why lack of
uniformity would seriously imperil the negotiability of federal paper;
private parties seemed able to cope with variable state law within manageable limits. Moreover, the result of the decision could lead to confusion in the marketplace because of differences in the rules applicable
to governmental and private negotiable instruments. Subsequent cases
limited Clearfield to situations where governmental interests were most
directly affected,63 and even then sometimes adopted local law as the
appropriate rule of decision when failure to do so might interfere with
strongly articulated local policies.' When both federal and state interests are operative, the process involves balancing.6 5 In the absence of
state interests, however, the Clearfield uniformity doctrine has been applied to suits involving other kinds of government issued commercial
paper, government contracts, and federal liens.6 6
2.

Tort Actions Implicating the Government's Interests

A somewhat analogous set of rules have developed regarding the
rights of the government in tort actions. The leading case is United
States v. StandardOil Co., 67 where the government sought to sue, for
loss of services and the costs of medical and disability payments, a
tortfeasor who had injured a government soldier. No federal statute
created a right of action on such facts, but local law provided for consequential and derivative claims in analogous situations. Relying upon
Clearfield-type analysis, the court reasoned that the issues and interests
were peculiarly federal
in character, justifying the application of fed68
eral common law.
62. See Friendly, supra note 5, at 410; Trautman, The Relations Between American
Choice of Law and FederalCommon Law, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 112
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Trautman]; Note, supra note 5, at 1526-31.
63. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
65. See Trautman, supra note 62, at 113-14.
66. See WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 280 nn. 11-13. Professor Wright notes that the
universal adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) should make it, and
not the federal common law, the uniform national rule of commerce, but that the
cases have continued to apply the federal common law even when it differs from
the nationally uniform UCC rules. Id at 280.
67. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
68. The reasoning of the Court was as follows:
[Tihe scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in [military] service and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority
... . So also are interferences with this relationship such as the facts of
this case involve. For, as the Federal Government has the exclusive
power to establish and define the relationship by virtue of its military
and other powers, equally clearly it has the power in execution of the
same functions to protect the relation once formed from harms inflicted
by others.
Since also the Government's purse is affected, its fiscal powers ...
add their weight to the military basis for excluding state intrusion.
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The Standard Oil Court's analysis of the other Cleafield questions-what federal law might be and whether it should override local
law-differed considerably from that in Cleaoeld The Court discussed the choice of law issues extensively and concluded that the government's interest indicated the issues should be resolved without resort
to local law.69 As the Court saw it, the questions were "chiefly . . . of
federal fiscal policy, not of special or peculiar concern to the states or
its citizens."' The soldier-government relation, the Court believed,
while analogous to certain relationships under local law, was so distinctly and exclusively a concern of federal law as to make state law
irrelevant. 7' In addition was the problem of uniformity; the Court
could find "no good reason why the Government's right to be indemnified . . . should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the
several states, simply because the soldier marches . . . across state
lines."' 2
The next part of StandardOil also differs from Clearfield Unlike
the Clearfield Court, which seemed to be going out of its way to protect
federal interests by venturing into a vast field involving the flow of federal paper,7 3 the Standard Oil majority was much more restrictive.
Having loudly heralded the need to protect the putative federal interests of the national treasury and the soldier-government relationship
the Court declined to do so, refusing7 to
fashion a common law right of
4
action on behalf of the government.
Id at 305-06.
69. The Court stated that:
Whether or not .
state law is to control in [this case] is not at all a
matter to be decided by application of the Erie rule. For, except where
the Government has simply substituted itself for others as successor to
rights governed by state law, the question is one of federal policy, affecting not merely the federal judicia[ry] . . . but also the Government's
legal interests and relations, a factor not controlling in the types of cases
. . . governed by the Erie ruling. And the answer to be given necessarily
is dependant upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them
of applying state law. These include not only considerations of federal
supremacy in the performance of federal functions, but of the need for
uniformity and, in some instances, inferences to be properly drawn from
the fact that Congress, though cognizant of the particular problem, has
taken no action to change long-settled ways of handling it.
Id at 309-10.
70. Id at 311.
71. Id
72. Id at 310.
73. Of course after Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29
(1956) and United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), it is perhaps untrue that
Clearfieldin fact heralded a body of federal common law with quite such a wide
sweep.
74. This part of the decision drew a sharp if lonely dissent from Justice Jackson. He
could not understand why the court had:
qualms about applying. . . well-known principles of tort law to this...
state of facts . . . . The law of torts has been developed almost exclu-
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Cases like Standard Oil can give the impression that the court
failed to make common law. But the decision did make law, though of
a somewhat negative kind. The uniformity arguments as well as those
indicating the lack of state interest are sufficient to preempt the government's claimed right to sue a tortfeasor who injures a soldier in those
states where private citizens could obtain damages in analogous circumstances. Given this, one wonders what purpose was served by the
court's discussion of protecting federal interests.
3. Federal Preemption with Federal Interests
Closely analogous to the Clearfield-StandardOil line of cases,
where direct governmental pecuniary interest and a need for national
uniformity combined to justify the ousting of state law in cases involving federal entities, are another group of new federal common law
cases, the best known of which is Textile Workers Union of America v.
Lincoln Mills.75 In that litigation a union sued the mill management to
enforce an arbitration clause in the labor-management contract. Pursuant to a federal jurisdictional statute, suit was filed in federal district
court. The question involved was under what law the contractual provision for arbitration was to be construed. Under local law such a provision was deemed unenforcible, an executory "agreement to agree."
Federal positive law was silent on the issue. Reversing the Fifth Circuit, a divided 76 Supreme Court upheld the district court's order of enforcement on the basis that federal common law of labor-management
contracts was to be used in construing such provisions and that such
law mandated enforcement.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Lincoln Mills found authority
to fashion federal common law in the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947. The Act provides for federal jurisdiction to hear suits for
violations of labor contracts, and permits suit by or against a union as
an entity.7 7 The legislation does not purport either to create the right to
contract in labor-management relations or to define the contractual
rights of either side once a contract is made. On its face all the statute
does is vest the federal courts with jurisdiction to hear contract disputes
sively by the judiciary in England and this country by common-law
methods. With few exceptions, tort liability does not depend upon legislation. If there is one function which I should think we would feel free
to exercise under a Constitution which vests in us judicial power, it
would be to apply well-established common law principles to a case
whose only novelty is in facts.
Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 318 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
75. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
76. Justice Frankfurter filed a vigorous dissent on statutory and constitutional
grounds. See id at 460. Justices Burton and Harlan concurred in the result, but
not on the basis of statutory construction. See id at 459. Justice Black did not
participate. Thus, only four members of the court supported Justice Douglas'
opinion.
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
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once they arise and to declare that unions can be treated as juristic
persons in such suits. Nevertheless, on the basis of admittedly weak"8
and heavily controverted7 9 construction of the legislative history and
language of the statute, Justice Douglas concluded that Congress intended to create a broad body of federal labor contract law "which the
[federal) courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws." 80 Having reached this conclusion, Douglas decided that it
would foster the congressional policy of creating industrial peace to
place sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievances, and thus to
ignore the local law in this case.
Lincoln Mills is an ambiguous case. The majority opinion can be
interpreted as supporting the proposition that a grant of federal jurisdiction necessarily carries with it the implication that Congress is vesting federal judges with general power to make law, at least in the
absence of statutory direction to the contrary.8 While this view is superficially consistent with the admiralty, interstate dispute, and early
bankruptcy cases, it goes beyond anything the Supreme Court has ever
said directly, at least since Erie,82 and is entirely unwarranted on the
basis of that opinion alone.8 3 The opinion may also be read broadly as
78. Justice Douglas' majority opinion characterized the legislative history of the Act
as "somewhat cloudy and confusing," though he argued it contained "a few shafts
of light that illuminate our problem." Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 452. Later, he
conceded that "there is a great medley of ideas reflected in the hearings, reports,
and debates on this Act." Yet, he found, "abundantly clear" support from the
"entire tenor of the history [of the Act] .... ."Id at 455.
79. Justice Frankfurter began his attack on the majority's construction this way:
[T]he Court has a "clear". . . conclusion emerge from the "somewhat,"
to say the least, "cloudy and confusing legislative history." This is more
than can be fairly asked even from the alchemy of construction ....
[T]he Court relies on a few isolated statements in the legislative history
which do not support its conclusion, however favoringly read ....
[T]he legislative history reinforces the natural meaning of the statute as
an exclusively procedural provision, affording. . . an accessible federal
forum for suits on agreements between labor organizations and employers, but not enacting federal law for such suits.
Id at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-30
(1957).
80. Lincoln Aills, 353 U.S. at 456.
81. See infra note 92.
82. See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 786
(2d ed. 1973). Certain cases decided during the heydey of Swift's regime do suggest that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to give federal courts general
lawmaking power. See, e.g., Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1883); Gelpcke v.
City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 175 (1864).
83. Professor Mishkin, in discussing whether the grant of federal jurisdiction to cases
in which the United States is a party justifies federal common law noted that:
Erie would tend to cast doubt on implication of lawmaking power simply from the grant of jurisdiction over suits brought by the United
States, if only because (1) it establishes that jurisdictional grants do not
necessarily entail such a power; and (2) it expresses a strong policy
against differences in governing law being based on choice of tribunal (a
problem not present in suits between states).
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suggesting that whenever Congress has legislated a great deal in a given
area, the courts are ipso facto authorized to make law in the area.8 4
Lower court cases like Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines,8 5 in which the
Seventh Circuit upheld a right of contribution by one tortfeasor against
another in an air collision case because of the degree to which air transport is federally regulated (despite the generally recognized view that
primary liability of air carriers turns on state law) seem to suggest occasional judicial adoption of this view. On the other hand, the mere fact
of congressional legislation "around" a subject certainly may not be
taken as a broad authorization to fashion new rights and remedies, as
recent Supreme Court decisions make clear."6
The narrowest reading one could place upon Lincoln Mills would
be to suggest that it is merely a run-of-the-mill case of statutory construction. Justice Douglas' discussion of the Labor-Management Relations Act and particularly its legislative history hints that the Court had
somehow found a legislative decision to vest the courts with general
lawmaking power. The problem with this view is that the legislation's
language and history are totally inadequate to support the argument.8 7
Douglas' opinion implies that allowing state contract law to render
unenforceable an arbitration clause in a labor contract would seriously
frustrate the broad purposes of the federal statute, which clearly was
drawn on the basis that collective bargaining was a surer way to industrial peace than walk-outs or lock-outs.8 8 Without imputing any intent
to Congress, which may not have considered the issue, one can conclude the operation of state law in this context would be hostile to the
Mishkin, supra note 5, at 799 n. 10.
84. Professor Hill's informative article can be misapplied to justify this view. Professor Hill argues that constitutional preemption often furnishes a sounder basis than
does remote statutory policy for the creation of federal common law, particularly
with respect to situations involving foreign maritime law, relations, and the proprietary interests of the United States. Certainly his view automatically justifies a
broad-based federal common law. Hill, supra note 5, at 1080. But cf. Hill, The
Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HAv. L. REV. 1013, 1050 (1953) ("The federal
courts may make substantive law only to effect a policy derived from the Constitution or from a valid Act of Congress.") (emphasis supplied).
85. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
86. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451
U.S. 77, 96-97 (1981) (Court unanimously and explicitly rejected Kohr). For a
discussion of Northwest, see infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 78-79.
88. Much of Justice Douglas' opinion amounted to recitations of statements in the
bill's legislative history indicating that its purpose was to provide for industrial
peace by providing enforceable contracts with no-strike clauses. See Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at 453-55. Only after this recitation does the opinion say it:
seems. . . clear. . . that Congress adopted a policy which placed sanctions behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes, by implication
rejecting the common law rule against enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate. We would undercut the Act and defeat its policy if
we read § 301 narrowly as only conferring jurisdiction over labor
organizations.
Id at 456 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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purposes of the statute. This, together with the jurisdictional grant, the
total legislative preemption of related areas, and perhaps the preferability of a nationally uniform rule to cover a process which inevitably
crosses state lines, would justify the decision to make federal law the
vessel for construing contract terms on a case-by-case basis. 9 So read,
Lincoln Mills is quite consistent with the implied remedies cases, in
which the Court has fashioned private remedies to correct constitutional 90 or statutory 9 l wrongs when state law was viewed as hostile to
federal interests or when federal legislative
interests would be frus92
trated in the absence of a federal remedy.
This interpretation of Lincoln Mills also permits due regard for
appropriate balancing of state and federal interests in and outside of
the particular context in which the case was decided. There is nothing
in Lincoln Mills to suggest that the Court would not adopt, as the appropriate rule for decision, local law whenever statutory policy and national uniformity interests would not be seriously impaired and
important local policies and expectations would be vindicated.9 3 Quite
89. See Note, supra note 5, at 1532-35. The writer, after concluding that the result
was not fairly inferable from concepts of national sovereignty, congressional intent, or a need to fashion federal remedies for breaches of federal duties, nevertheless approved it as an efficient and effective way of protecting federal concerns,
providing creative lawmaking to further such concerns and supporting Congress'
policy of encouraging judicial enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
Id.
90. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
91. See, e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
92. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), the Court implied a private right of action for damages stemming
from violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures. The court deemed it necessary to note that restricting a person
wronged under the amendment to his state created rights under local trespass or
invasion of privacy law might subject him to "inconsistent or even hostile" local
rules. Id at 394. In T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), Judge
Friendly declined to fashion a federal right of action to enforce an assignment of
copyright interest, or to construe federal jurisdictional statutes as covering such
actions, but said the court should "not be understood ... as necessarily agreeing
• . . that federal jurisdiction would not exist if a complaint alleged that a state
declined to enforce assignments of copyright valid under federal law." Id. at 827.
Moreover, Lincoln Mills is consistent with the commerce clause preemption cases
which outlaw state regulation which would seriously impair the flow of interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959);
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940). It is also consistent with the preemption
cases which outlaw state regulation which would interfere with the operation of
comprehensive federal legislation in a given area. See, e.g., Castle v. Hayes
Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 346
U.S. 672, 685 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S.
598 (1940).
93. Such would be the case when a court was called upon to apply family benefits
flowing from a labor contract. Cf. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966)
(governmental interest in uniform rule on federal loan must yield to policy of
Texas protecting married women from being bound on own contracts); De Sylvia
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to the contrary, the Court in Lincoln Mills suggested it would be quite
appropriate to adopt by reference state law in such circumstances.94
Lincoln Mills was at one time viewed as a possible mandate for
creating broad bodies of federal common law in any area heavily regulated by federal legislation when the desired federal common law rules
would be consistent with the regulation. 95 This was true whether the
case was seen as an implied remedies case, where the court was somehow interpreting a vague phrase, or a federal common law case, where
the court was perceived as filling in an interstitial area found in provisions of federal statute law. The scope of the decision, however, has
been seriously narrowed in recent years by judicial tightening of statutory construction in cases involving implied remedies and by requiring
that a party seeking development of affirmative federal common law
show a strong need for a national rule supported by both uniformity
considerations and a sense that judicial lawmaking is somehow compelled by peculiar circumstances.9 6
v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (copyright law provision for renewal by "children" of author construed to incorporate illegitimate offspring consonant with
state policy of descent and distribution and domestic relations).
94. 353 U.S at 457.
95. Judge Friendly's early comment was that Lincoln Mills "is pregnant with possibilities." Friendly, supra note 5, at 413. Lower courts, following his lead, have
created rights and remedies against interstate telephone companies, Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1968), and airlines, Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), because they were in heavily regulated industries
and the desired federal common law rules would be consistent with the regulations. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 282, properly calls both decisions "debatable."
96. In a recent dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens outlined the process in the following way:
During most of our history. . . [we held that] a statute enacted for the
benefit of a special class presumptively afforded a remedy for members
of that class injured by violations of the statute. Applying that presumption, our truly conservative federal judges. . . readily concluded that it
was appropriate to allow private parties who had been injured by a violation of a statute enacted for their special benefit to obtain judicial relief
...
. Since the earliest days of the common law, it has been the business of courts to fashion remedies for wrongs. In recent years, however, a
Court that is properly concerned about the burdens imposed upon the
Federal Judiciary, the quality of the work product of Congress, and the
sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant
to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. In 1975, in Cort v.
Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court cut back on the simple common law
presumption by fashioning a four factor formula that led to the denial of
relief in that case. Although multi-factor balancing tests generally tend
to produce negative answers, more recently some Members of the Court
have been inclined to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod
to Cor . . . factors. The touchstone now is congressional intent.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
23-25 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted); see also
Texas Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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Federal Preemption Without Federal Interests

A recent example of this trend is the unanimous decision in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union ofAmerica.9 7 The plaintiff, an employer liable to employees for back pay as a result of
discrimination in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was seeking a judicial ruling to obtain
contribution from the defendant union as an implied right under the
statutes or as a matter of federal common law. The Court treated each
argument separately and rejected both. With respect to the question
whether the right to contribution could be implied from the statutes,
the Court found no support for such implication from the language,
legislative history, or purpose of the statutory scheme.9 8 Noting the
comprehensive nature of the federal legislation, the Court said no positive inference could be drawn from Congress' failure to address the
contribution issue. 99 Turning to the issue whether it should fashion
federal common law in the area, the Court noted cases in which it had
construed broadly-worded constitutional and statutory provisions "in
the common law tradition," and recognized its duty to fashion common
law, in the absence of leislation, "in cases raising issues of uniquely
federal concern . ...
But then the majority drew back. First there was an ode to judicial
deference to Congress. 0 1 Second, the Court, after conceding that no
inference could be drawn from congressional silence on the issue, went
on to conclude that Congress had decided not to create the remedy, on
the basis that the comprehensiveness of the legislation suggested that
Congress deliberately omitted it. 102
97. 451 U.S. 77 (1981). Justice Blackmun did not participate in the decision, but all
eight remaining justices concurred in the court's opinion, penned by Justice
Stevens.
98. 1d at 86-91.
99. Id at 94-95.
100. Id at 95. The Court also recognized the admiralty line of cases, including a case
in which it had upheld the federal common law rule of contribution against attack
on Erie grounds because of inconsistency with local law, Cooper Stevedoring Co.
v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974), as creating a zone largely occupied by a
specialized body of federal common law. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981). In discussing the
admiralty exception to the new general rule against lawmaking by federal judges,
the Court adverted to the jurisdictional necessity argument mentioned above in
the discussion of the admiralty cases. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying
text. The Court then cited Lincoln Mills as justified by "analogous considerations." 451 U.S. at 96.
101. "Federal courts," the Supreme Court said:
unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that
have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers .... [W]e
consistently have emphasized that the federal lawmaking power is vested
in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government; therefore, federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Congress."
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95. (citations omitted).
102. The Court stated that:
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The weakness of the first part of the majority's opinion is overmatched by that of the second. The question was one of whether to
create a common law right of action. Stevens, writing for the majority,
adverted to, but did not directly discuss, the view of the district court
below that the common law no-contribution rule was archaic and inequitable.1" 3 Similarly, he noted, but barely discussed, the fact that
nearly all the states have abandoned the rule'0° and that the lower federal courts have recently tended to overthrow it with regard to federal
causes of action. 10 5 Stevens then reiterated the desire not to "upset
carefully considered legislative programs," stated that congressional inaction regarding the right to contribution suggested deliberate rejection, and concluded that it would be presumptuous for the Court to
"fashion a new. . . rule which Congress has declined to adopt." IoI At
least with respect to the Title VII contribution claim, reliance upon judicial deference and legislative intent involved entirely fatuous reasoning.107 Indeed, as Hart and Sacks have demonstrated in other contexts,

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

The authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the
authority to fashion a new rule ... which Congress had decided not to
adopt. The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a
statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement. Both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII ... are such statutes. The
judiciary may not, in the face of such comprehensive legislative schemes,
fashion new remedies that might upset carefully considered legislative
programs.
Id. at 97. While Northwest Airlines might be rationalized as a desire to alleviate
docket load, the Court's analysis is suspect. The section dealing with implied
remedies on the basis of statutory construction purported to apply the four-factor
test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which includes not only statutory language, history, and purpose, but also the likelihood that Congress intended to
supersede or supplement existing state remedies. However, it applied only the
first three factors, avoiding mention of the fourth. Since surely the question of
whether there should be a right of contribution among joint violators of a federal
statute is not a question which should be relegated to state law and hence answered differently depending upon where the discriminatory events occurred, this
last factor would seem to weigh against the decision of the court. It might not be
significant enough to outweigh the others but it should have been addressed. In a
later case the same term, then in dissent, Justice Stevens criticized "some Members of the Court [for] hav[ing] been inclined to deny relief with little more than a
perfunctory nod to the Cort. . . factors." See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth.
v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Interestingly, Stevens then cites as an example a concurring opinion of Justice
Rehnquist in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 301 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring), rather than the Northwest Airlines opinion, which Stevens himself
had written.
451 U.S. at 83-84.
Id at 87 n. 17. The Court notes that 39 states and the District of Columbia have
abandoned the rule, ten by judicial decision and the remainder by statute.
Id. at 91-92 nn. 24-25.
Id at 97.
The Court did not detail how the Title VII scheme might be "upset" if contribution were allowed. The Court does say that the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission, appearing as amicus, argued for contribution in the court of appeals
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10 8
legislative inaction is scant proof of anything at all.
This of course does not mean the ultimate result was wrong. One
could easily decide to deny discriminators relief because of their presumptively dirty hands. Similarly, one could rationalize a result against
discriminators simply on the basis that, absent affirmative congressional direction, the courts should refrain from creating rights of access
to already overworked federal courts. The point is, however, that nothing in the Court's opinion even remotely suggests consideration of such
concerns. Thus, though the result may have been correct, the mode of
analysis was lacking.
It would be a misreading of Northwest Airlines to assume it does
not make federal common law and is inconsistent with the older cases.
The opinion itself breeds such error by failing to discuss the choice of
law issue it necessarily had to decide while talking lengthily but pointlessly about deference to congressional primacy in making federal
law."° StandardOil teaches that, in areas of exclusive federal concern,
when one can fathom no legitimate reason for permitting differences
depending on where the facts arise, denial of a right of action is every

and then argued against contribution in the Supreme Court, basing its later argument on the "upset" theory. Id at 88-89. A conclusory footnote reference to a
ffipflopping agency is not highly persuasive. The reference to a "comprehensive"
remedial scheme is little more than a charade; all Title VII assures is equitable
relief for victims of discrimination. The remedial provisions of Title VII are general, and only look to protecting victims of "unlawful employment practices." After setting forth administrative preconditions for private actions, the statute speaks
to their judicial remedy as follows:
[Tihe court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer,
. . . or labor organization, as the case may be. . . or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The subsection then proceeds to limit recovery of
backpay under certain circumstances not here relevant.
For broader "pattern and practice" violations, for which suit is authorized by
the Attorney General or the EEOC, the remedial section is much shorter, permitting "such relief, including. . . permanent or temporary injunction, restraining
order or other order against the person or persons responsible for such pattern or
practice, as. . . necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights herein described." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1976). This "comprehensive scheme" certainly
"comprehends" relief for victims. Equally as clear it does not "comprehend" the
question of relief for one wrongdoer against another. Repeatedly calling it "comprehensive" fails to diminish the truth of the previous sentence.
Indeed, there is no evidence that the inaction was "deliberate," or even conscious. Quite to the contrary, the only evidence offered by the Court is that Congress failed to say, hear, or decide anything at all regarding contribution - quite
possibly because its members did not think one collective second about it.
108. HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1381-1401 (1958).
109. Close reading of the decision brings forth a footnote in which the Court, in a
backhanded way, acknowledges that state law would not be the appropriate rule
of decision on the facts in Northwest Airlines. See 451 U.S. at 97 n.38.
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bit as much a federal common law decision as would be its grant." 10
Northwest Airlines is precisely such a case for one cannot imagine what
interest the states would have in applying their own rules of contribution to a problem which exists solely because of the federal statute.
Nor can one suggest any reason why a co-discriminator's liability
should vary according to where the acts of discrimination occur. To
the contrary, whatever interests are involved arise from the federal statute, and whatever rule should prevail ought to be, in view of the multistate nature of many employers, unions, and jobs, nationally uniform.
5. Interest Analysis and Preemption
The Cleari)eld-StandardOil and the Lincoln Mills-Northwest Airlines holdings have much in common with the traditional lines of cases
employing federal judge-made law. In all these cases a judge's authority to make law is posited upon a federal interest in the subject matter
of the lawsuit."'I In some cases this interest appears direct, immediate
and concrete. 1 2 In others it appears less immediate, more abstract,
emanating from a sense that in the constitutional scheme of things the
issues are more appropriately a matter of federal than local concern,' 13
or from a belief that the operation of local law could seriously impair
some federal regulatory interest.'
Frequently a background of federal positive law - constitutional, statutory, or regulatory - is conjured up to evidence a federal regulatory interest in the subject matter
of the suit. The influence this law has upon the case may be more or
less direct." 5 In addition there is the frequent perception of a positive
110. The Court itself appears oblivious to the fact that decisions like Northwest Airlines
do in fact constitute federal common law, albeit of a somewhat limited kind.
Consider the Court's unanimous opinion in Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), where it extended the reasoning of Northwest Airlines in such a way as to eliminate contribution among violators of the antitrust
statutes. The Texas Indus. opinion suggests that Erie prohibits federal common
law except in two circumstances: when a federal rule is needed to protect
uniquely federal interests or when Congress has authorized federal judges to develop substantive law. Id at 640. The opinion then proceeds to demonstrate how
the contribution question fails to fit either circumstance. Id at 640-46.
111. Professor Trautman sees federal common law as a vehicle for vindicating "identifiable federal concerns which cannot be accommodated satisfactorily within the
body of relevant state law." Trautman, supra note 62, at 114. Professor Mishkin
believes "effective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal
courts to declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial legislation'. . . the governing law in an area comprising issues substantially related to an established
program of government operation." MISHKIN, supra note 5, at 800-01. Federal
concerns" and "functions" involve not only ongoing federal legislative programs,
but also interstate peace, international relations, and interstate and international
commerce. Id Whether one talks of "concerns," "functions," or "interest," the
idea is the same: there must be a means of effectuating national interests in areas
of national concern or function.
112. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
113. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
114. See, e.g., Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
115. Cases like Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
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need for a uniform rule on an issue - or at least that there are no
significant reasons why uniformity should be sacrificed in the service of
some local rule. Finally, on occasion the Court adopts a federal rule
simply because the question seems inherently federal, because it arises
on account of a federal statute, and its determination implicates no
state interests.l"6 Thus, the Court justifies, in the absence of provisions
of federal positive law directing a different outcome, a federal judgemade rule consistent with the structure and purposes of existing federal
positive law.
The arguments summarized above are frequently used to justify
the exercise of legislative jurisdiction by federal judges. Similar considerations often come into play when a court, having concluded it can
adopt a federal common law rule, makes the decision whether to do so
or to adopt by reference local law. That precisely the same considerations might weigh heavily both in the constitutional decision regarding
whether judicial power exists and in the prudential judgment as to
whether and to what extent it should be exercised should not be surprising to students of federal jurisdiction. I7 This is particularly true of
the uniformity policy. In many of the old admiralty cases, and in Sabbatino, Clearfield, and Lincoln Mills, uniformity was used not only to
justify a federal common law decision, but also to justify preempting
any deference to local law as well.
When federal interests in a particular result are weakest, however,
the policy of uniformity may give way if it would interfere with legitimate state policies or party expectations created in light of them. The
process is a weighing one."' 8 While one can occasionally disagree with
(1957), Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), and Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), appear to be mere extensions
of the comprehensive regulatory schemes enshrouding the questions they
presented, while many from the admiralty and interstate dispute lines, see supra
notes 25-56 and accompanying text, appear to arise almost spontaneously from
jurisdictional statutes which provide federal judges an almost intuitive sense that
in the absence of Congressional legislation only they can fashion an appropriate
rule of decision.
116. See supra notes 67-74, 97-110 and accompanying text.
117. For example the Supreme Court has called the justiciability doctrine "a blend of
constitutional requirements and policy considerations." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 97 (1968). Confusion between the two is frequent. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249, 255 (1953), the Court admitted it had "not always clearly distinguished"
case-or-controversy standing limitations and what it referred to as "complementary rule(s) of self-restraint for its own governance." Today the dichotomy is
often phrased in terms of article III and "prudential" limitations on federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). What the cases say about
standing could easily be said about the other branches of justiciability. For example, in discussing ripeness, scholars have noted that "opinions denying (declaratory) relief often leave it doubtful whether the court thought that a controversy
was lacking or simply that declaratory relief was inappropriate." HART & WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

353 (2d ed. 1973).

118. Bankruptcy judges are willing to recognize vested state rights, but are not bound
to give all of them the same priority in making equitable distribution of an estate;
federal courts are willing to hold that the United States is bound by provisions of
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the way the Court has struck the balance of interests in particular cases,
one cannot avoid the sense that on occasion it is clearly a necessary
concomitant of the power to choose among conflicting rules of decision.
Analysis of the federal common law cases is generally conducted entirely apart from discussion of the Erie cases, as if these lines had little
in common. The thesis of this article is that both bodies of law are cut
from common cloth and that understanding one can aid analysis of the
other. Before demonstrating these points, the investigation must examine the Erie and Byrd decisions.
III.
A.

THE ERIE-BYRD DOCTRINE
The Erie Holding

Swift v. Tyson .9 had authorized federal courts to develop their
own rules of decision in diversity cases when no state statute dictated
the appropriate rule and when the questions were ones of "general"
rather than "local" law. Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 120 overruling
Swift, held, apparently on constitutional, statutory, and policy grounds,
that a federal court sitting in diversity may not fashion general federal
common law rules of decision but rather has to apply state law.
Viewed from the perspective of this writer, it is hard to believe the
Swft opinion was drafted with the intent to authorize federal judges to
independently fashion common law rules in all diversity cases. Justice
Story's opinion in Swft never suggested that Congress, much less the
federal courts, possessed general legislative jurisdiction to determine all
rights and obligations arising under state law. Instead, in order to permit the federal judiciary to fashion sound national rules when there
was a need for uniformity, as with respect to questions of negotiability
of notes which would easily cross state lines, Justice Story adopted
what we would now call a fiction: the notion that judge-made law is not
law at all, but merely evidence of what the law is. This permitted him
to avoid the Rules of Decision Act, 2 ' which he otherwise conceded
required that state "law" be applied as the rule of decision, at least in
local real estate law in title disputes and yet not willing to find it bound by local
rules regarding negotiable paper. The state interest in requiring compliance with
the wills statute to pass community property to a surviving spouse is insufficient to
outweigh the federal interest in having simple national rules regarding passage of
title by co-purchasers of government bonds, because of the presumed tendency of
such rules to promote the salability of such bonds and the efficient management of
the national debt. The state interest in protecting a surviving spouse's property
right under local community property law is, however, sufficient to outweigh the
same federal interest. See Trautman, supra note 62, at 113-14.
119. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
120. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
121. Currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), the Rules of Decision Act remains
unchanged from the time of the Swift decision, except for minor revisions occurring in 1948. The present version of the statute reads as follows: "The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or
Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of deci-
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the absence of supervening federal authority. 2 Yet it also led to an
anomaly: the judge-made "law" the federal courts adopted under Swift
was no more controlling over state judges than was the judge-made law
of state courts controlling over the federal courts. This anomaly inevitably led to a failure of the national uniformity policy which Justice
23
Story meant Swift to encourage. 1
The Erie facts are familiar and can be briefly stated. Tompkins
was walking along a railroad's right of way when an object projecting
from a passing train struck him. Under state law his status appeared to
be that of a trespasser, able to recover only for willful and wanton misconduct. Under federal general law he would be considered a licensee,
sion in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
Id
122. Justice Story was trying to avoid the argument that the Rules of Decision Act
required application of the New York common law cases holding that an endorsee who had obtained a note in consideration of cancellation of a pre-existing
debt could not prevail as a holder in due course in a suit against the maker who
was defending on the basis of fraud. "In order to maintain the argument," he
said,
it is essential.

. .

to hold

. . .

that the word "laws"

...

includes within

the scope of its meaning, the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended that the decisions of
courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws
are, and are not of themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are found
to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. The laws of
a State are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments
promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long established local customs having the force of laws . .

. [W]e have not now the

.

slightest difficulty in holding, that this section. . . is strictly limited to
local statutes and local usages of the character before stated, and does
not extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature,
the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the
decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.
It becomes necessary for us, therefore, .. to express our own opinion of the true result of the commercial law upon the question now
before us. And we have no hesitation in saying, that a pre-existing debt
does constitute a valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule
. . .applicable to negotiable instruments.

.

.

. [To] establish the oppo-

site conclusion. . . probably [would undermine] more than one half of
all bank transactions in our country, as well as those of other countries
... .The doctrine would strike a fatal blow at all discounts of negotiable securities for pre-existing debts.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-20 (1842). As Professor Hill has remarked,
the overruling of Swift "reflects essentially a changed jurisprudence rather than a
changed view of the Constitution." Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution,
53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 443 (1958).
123. The failure of the policy is well documented. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 74 n.7 (1938). Of the commentators, only Professor Crosskey has suggested that Swift-type federal common law should govern in state as well as federal courts. See 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION chs. 25-26
(1953). Crosskey's views are attacked in Friendly, supra note 5, at 394, and Hill,
The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 444-45 (1958).
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free to recover upon proof-of ordinary negligence. The federal district
court applied federal general law and was affirmed by the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Brandeis' majority opinion was a broad based attack on
Swift. In part the opinion rested on policy considerations and statutory
construction conclusions diametrically opposed to Justice Story's in
Swift. Brandeis argued that Swif was bad policy for three reasons.
First, the uniformity it had attempted to facilitate had failed to materialize. Second, there was confusion resulting from this as well as from
the inherent ambiguity of the national-local distinction developed in
Swift's progeny.' 24 Third, and most important, Swi and its progeny
engendered a sense of unjust arbitrariness arising from the uneven
treatment of similar cases tried in neighboring state and federal courthouses. 2 Justice Brandeis' treatment of the statutory construction issue was terse: recent scholarship proved that the term "laws" within the
Rules of Decision Act was meant to refer to judge-made as well as
positive law,' 26 and hence Justice Story was just plain wrong.
The Erie majority stated that it would not have overruled Swft on
policy or statutory grounds alone. Indeed, the Court said it would not
have acted but for the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued"
128
under SwOi. 127 This aspect of Erie has been criticized as dictum
which was unnecessary, 2 1 ill-considered 3 and vague.'' Such criti124. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74.
125. Id at 74-77.
126. Id at 72-73. This part of Justice Brandeis' opinion has received heavy criticism
from several quarters. See, e.g., 1 & 2 CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 626-28, 866-71 (1953); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv.
693, 703 n.59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ely]; Friendly, supra note 5, at 389-91;
Shulman, The Demise of Swif v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1345 (1938); Note,
Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284, 285 n.8 (1969).
127. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
128. Justice Stone later wrote Justice Roberts that Erie's constitutional discussion was
"unfortunate dicta." MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 480-81
(1956). Judge Clark agreed. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts.- The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946).
129. Justice Reed was content to concur on the basis of the majority's nonconstitutional arguments, and commentators picked up on this to argue that there was
simply no need to address the constitutional issue in order to overthrow the regime of Swi. See, e.g., COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136-37 (1942); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme
Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 190 (1967); Shulman, The Demise of Swi/t v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336, 1342, 1344 (1938).
130. Justice Butler's dissent in Erie noted, inter alia, that the issue of whether Swift
should be overruled as unconstitutional had not been briefed. This complaint was
once widely heralded. Judge Friendly, a friend of the decision, concedes reargument might have "shown the weakness of the . . . 'discovery'" of evidence regarding the meaning of the Rules of Decision Act, and seems tacitly to accept the
methodological criticism, but blunts it with the remark that "the vital thing. . . is
whether the opinion is sound, not whether it manifested an 'excathedra approach.' " Friendly, supra note 5, at 399 n.71.
131. Professor Wright notes that Erie was an "unusual. . . constitutional decision [in
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cisms are unjustified. The first three criticisms can be given short shrift.
The constitutional basis of the decision will not evaporate because people do not like it.' 32 The judges said that it was necessary, that without
it they "should not be prepared to abandon" the Swift doctrine, 133 and
they must be taken at their word. The claim that Erie was ill-considered appears a bit lame when one realizes that at least since the Black &
White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab and Transfer
Co. 134 case ten years before the Erie decision, Swit had been raked
35
over the coals by judges and commentators alike.
The claim of vagueness deserves a bit more attention. It must be
granted that the Brandeis opinion fails to cite a single provision of the
Constitution in support of its constitutional holding. This is justified,
or at least explainable, in light of the extremely basic nature of the
constitutional rationale of the decision. Erie clearly, and correctly, suggests that in our form of government, the federal 36courts have no general
legislative mandate to make law for the states.'

132.
133.
134.
135.

136.

that it]
avoids making specific reference to the constitutional provision involved"
and criticizes the opinion as "cryptic." WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 261.
WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 262; Ely, supra note 126, at 702-03 n.59; Friendly, supra
note 5, at 385-86; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV.
427, 439 (1958).
Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
The Taxicab case, had, of course, involved a considerable extension of the Swft
principle in a setting pervaded by unconscionable forum shopping. The Taxicab
majority opinion drew one of Justice Holmes' most biting dissents. See id at 532
(Holmes, J., dissenting). The dissent focused not only on the extension of Swift,
but on the doctrine itself. Holmes argued that Swi rested on "an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time
or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct," and that this
assumption rested on the patent fallacy that there is "a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed
by statute . . . ." Id at 533. Justice Holmes' position in the Taxicab case was
repeatedly cited in Justice Brandeis' majority opinion in Erie. See Erie, 304 U.S.
at 79-80. Brandeis noted the widespread criticism of Swift after the Taxicab case
was decided. Id at 73 n.6. As Judge Friendly wryly remarked years later, "It
seems likely that certiorari had been granted in Erie . . .with more in mind than
whether the particular question decided by the court of appeals was one of 'general' or 'local' law; and it is certain that Brandeis was not alone in thinking from
the outset that the continued existence of Swift was at stake." Friendly, supra
note 5, at 399 n.71. Friendly goes on to review the fact that the constitutional
issues were addressed on oral argument, and that the parties could have asked for
opportunity to rebrief the issues had they so chosen, and hence could claim no
"unfairness." Id Finally, Friendly notes the spirited "intramural" debate among
the justices regarding the propriety of Erie's constitutional holding. Id.
As the Court later summed up Erie's constitutional holding:
[Nleither Congress nor the federal courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not
supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some
other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must govern
because there can be no other law.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965). The commentators now seem
agreed that the constitutional objection was to general federal lawmaking without
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Erie's constitutional basis has to do with two notions which per37
vade constitutional law - federalism and separation of powers.
Erie suggests a hybrid of tenth amendment, article I and article III
analysis. According to the tenth amendment, those legislative powers
not vested in the federal government are reserved to the states.' 38 One
cannot fred general legislative jurisdiction for Congress to enact laws
for the states in article I because it simply is not directly or indirectly on
the checklist found there. 139 Similarly, one cannot conclude that by
vesting the federal courts with article III judicial power the framers
intended to grant them general legislative jurisdiction, 4 0 or even legislative jurisdiction coterminous with that of Congress,' 4 ' because unbridled judicial exercise of such jurisdiction would be fundamentally
inconsistent
with the perceived view of the nature of judicial power
42
itself. 1

regard to some specific grant of power in the Constitution. See, e.g., Ely, supra
note 126, at 702-04; Friendly, supra note 5, at 397; Mishkin, Some Further Last
Words on Erie - The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974) [hereinafter cited Last Words].
137. Federalism suggests some sort of division of power between the federal and state
governments, while the separation of powers doctrine is tied up with the notion
that at any level of government there are fundamental divisions of power along
functional lines among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. X.

139. Judge Friendly advanced this tenth amendment argument in 1964. Friendly,
supra note 5, at 394. With Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), as a guide,
Professor Ely elucidated the argument more forcefully ten years later. See Ely,
supra note 126, at 700-04. Ely is responsible for the "checklist" language in the
text.
140. Friendly, supra note 5, at 395-98; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53
Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 439-45 (1958).
141. Last Words, supra note 136; Friendly, supra note 5; Note, The Competence of the
Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1085-86
(1964). Professor Mishkin's Harvard article, written in response to Ely's Irrepressible Myth article treats the subject most extensively. In his view, not only the
tenth amendment, but also
Principles related to the separation of powers impose [a] . . . limit on

the authority of federal courts to engage in lawmaking on their own (unauthorized by Congress).

.

.

. The point may perhaps be made most

easily by example. I take it there is little doubt that Congress could validly enact "no fault" liability for all automobile accidents in the country
- and no doubt at all about accidents on public thoroughfares carrying
interstate traffic. At the same time I take it as equally clear that the
federal courts would currently not seriously entertain the contention that
they should adopt a federal "no-fault" liability rule even if the. . . accident clearly involved interstate traffic .

. .

. I submit that this conclu-

sion is of constitutional dimension, and that any other course would be
"unconstitutional" in the sense that term was used in the Erie opinion.
Last Words, supra note 136, at 1683-85.
142. This exegesis of Erie's admittedly oblique constitutional discussion helps explain
why the majority may have rejected Justice Reed's concurring opinion. Justice
Reed: (1) stated that he had no doubt of Congress' power to enact legislation
based on the Article I checklist; (2) indicated uncertainty as to whether Congress
might enact substantive as well as procedural rules to govern all actions within the
federal courts' jurisdiction; and (3) suggested that in the absence of the Rules of
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While the tenth amendment aspect of the Erie holding has been
fully and adequately stated elsewhere, 4 3 the separation of powers aspect of Erie has not. 44 The gist of the argument may be illuminated
with the following problem. Suppose, as doubtless most members of
the 1938 Court would have surmised, Congress had power under the
article I commerce clause to enact comprehensive legislation which, inter alia, governed the issues in Erie or Swf/. Does it follow that, in the
total absence of such legislation, the Court would be free to exercise
lawmaking power co-extensive with the unexercised power of
Congress?
The answer must be no. There is a long, unbroken tradition of
Decision Act he would have serious doubts as to the Court's constitutional inability to adopt general common law rules coextensive with Congress' arguable power
to enact such substantive legislation. Therefore he preferred to rest the holding
solely on the statute and to postpone for future decision the constitutional issue.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 90, 91 (Reed, J., concurring). The majority opinion must be
viewed as an implicit rejection of at least part of Justice Reed's approach. It is
hard to believe the majority disagreed with his first proposition - the view that
Congress could act regarding matters on the federal checklist. Rather they doubtless took issue with his second and third propositions set out above. Indeed, the
opinion rejects the second--that Congress might possess general power to enact
any substantive rule it wishes simply on the basis of its power to create the lower
federal courts. Id at 78. Moreover, the opinion obliquely challenges the third on
the related basis that "no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such power
on the federal courts." Id
143. See supra note 139.
144. See supra note 141. The most expansive treatments are in Note, The Competence
of the Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1084,
1085-86 (1964) and Last Words, supra note 136, at 1683-85. The notewriter argues
that the Supreme Court's lawmaking powers are limited in part by the separation
of powers doctrine, but then goes on to build upon HART & WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953) to find deeper roots in federalism. Mishkin's piece also mixes separation of powers with federalism arguments. He justifies his decision that the federal courts could not alone fashion a
federal common law rule of no-fault, despite his certainty that Congress could do
so under the commerce power, as follows:
In my judgment, the clarity and strength with which the inappropriateness of federal judicial lawmaking. . . is perceived. . . is itself significant evidence of the constitutional nature of the limitation. On a more
theoretical level, I base my position in part on a consideration of how
differently the allocation of power between the states and the federal
government would appear if a contrary conception were adopted, and
how remote that allocation and that conception would be from any accepted view from the time of the Framers to the present. Even more
importantly, I base it on the structure established by the Constitution
whereby the states .
are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts.
Last Words, supra note 136, at 1685. I share Professor Mishkin's intuitive certainty. I have reservations about the federalism arguments, particularly the
"structural" one. Both the notewriter and Mishkin find support for it in Wechsler,
The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism The Role of the States in the Composition
and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954). In my
judgment, the argument unduly complicates what is in fact a really simple issue of
defining the distinction between adjudicative and legislative jurisdiction.
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judicial deference to legislative supremacy over the lawmaking function. When lawyers speak of the reasons why judges should not make
law they usually refer to tradition and prudential arguments about the
relative limitations of judicial method, the dependence of courts upon
litigation and inability to control their agendas, and the undemocratic
nature of judicial institutions. Nevertheless, such arguments easily
shade off into charges of judicial usurpation of legislative prerogative.
While stated largely in terms of prudential concerns, these arguments emanate from the very structure of governmental institutions
and fundamental conceptions of the nature of judicial power. The
Constitution speaks of three kinds of power - legislative,' 4 5 executive, 1I 6 and judicial, 4 7 and vests them respectively in the Congress, the
Presidency, and the Supreme Court and inferior courts to be established by Congress. Those who debated the Constitution's adoption
were vitally concerned that the separation of these powers should regularize restraints on federal power in order to preserve liberty. 4 8 More145. U.S. CONST. art. I.
146. U.S. CONST. art. II.
147. U.S. CONST. art. III.
148. Virtually all of the Framers were influenced by Montesquieu, who was perceived
as the fountainhead of the checks and balances theory which underlies the Constitution. For example, both Madison and Hamilton spoke reverently of him as "the
celebrated Montesquieu" in their arguments for the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at
301, 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Montesquieu's THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS, was first published in 1748 in Geneva but was widely disseminated in
America by the time of the framing of the Constitution. The work, particularly
Book XI, was quite influential in America. Most of his discussion relates to separating the legislative from the executive power. His reason was tersely stated: of
the three powers, "the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing .... ." Nevertheless, to protect the judiciary and to prevent tryanny, he wished to separate it
from the other two. See XI MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (T. Nugent
trans. 1952). This view of the relative weakness and unimportance of the judiciary and the judicial power runs through THE FEDERALIST as well. Madison was
sure the judicial branch was weak. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 210 (J.
Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). In the very paper in which Hamilton heralded
the doctrine of judicial review later adopted in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803), he displayed the same view, even going so far as to quote
Montesquieu's statement about the judiciary being "next to nothing." See THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Hamilton attributed the sovereign function of will to the legislature, and clearly indicated judicial
efforts to assume this function would be viewed as an illegitimate usurpation of
power. Id at 468-69.
Conceding that courts might misconstrue or even contravene legislative will
occasionally, Hamilton nevertheless felt this would "never . . . in any sensible
degree. . . affect the order of the political system." Id No. 81, at 485. Madison
believed that legislative power was clearly distinct from judicial power and that
judges should not exercise legislative power lest "the subject . . . be exposed to
arbitrary control." Id No. 47, at 303. Nothing in Hamilton's article for the power
of judicial review of congressional acts impeaches the idea that he shared these
views. The premise for judicial review was simply the existence of a higher law the Constitution - which, in cases of "irreconcilable variance [with Congressional acts]. . . ought, of course, to be preferred. . . . Nor does this conclusion
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over, they thought of the legislative power as functionally distinct from
judicial power, and as a corollary clearly accepted the inferiority of the
judicial branch in the lawmaking sphere.' 4 9
To say that federal judicial lawmaking power is more limited than
that of Congress is not to say it does not exist at all. The case law
previously discussed suggests federal common law is appropriate when
judges are pursuing some federal interest or purpose at least implicitly
evidenced by the Constitution or an act of Congress, or when there is a
perceived need for national uniformity on an issue created by federal
law and no reason at all for applying state law.1 50 But the uniformity

interest alone is not a mandate for broad judicial legislating.' 5 ' When

state interests are perceived to arise the inclination to adopt a uniform
federal rule must be tempered by due regard for state interests. Regarding the precise issue in Erie, there simply was no federal interest or
purpose emanating from any federal positive law to place on the scales
in juxtaposition to
the interests which would have been served by fol152
lowing state law.

149.

150.

151.
152.

by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only
supposes that the power of the people is superior to both ....
"Id No. 78, at
467-68.
One must concede that the Supreme Court has never squarely held that judicial
reticence to make law has constitutional underpinnings resting ultimately on the
article III, section 1 "judicial power" language. The Court's only direct references
to the article III phrase has arisen in contexts where the judges were using the
words interchangeably with "case-or-controversy" limitations of a different but
related subsection of the article. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911). The Court's failure to crystalize the "judicial power" concept as an independent limit on judicial lawmaking power, together with the fact that limitations on the propriety of judicial lawmaking are generally stated in terms of
tradition and prudential considerations, tends to obscure the idea that the question of judicial power to make law is likely subject to constitutional limitations.
Certainly the historical argument suggests that what is or is not within "judicial
power" has a constitutional dimension. Constitutional theory is consistent with
this view. Frequently, as in the justiciability area itself, the courts make policy
judgments with the full awareness that outer limits are imposed on their discretion
by background constitutional language and concerns. The cases dealing with judicial power limitations are not in conflict with this position. The fact that they
have not defined the Constitution's outer limits on judicial power, and have so far
seen fit only to articulate nonconstitutional arguments, is perfectly consistent with
the notion that constitutional limitations do lurk in the background. It may be
that it has simply been unnecessary to marshall them but that they remain available for those rare instances when they are needed. Since the Court has never
defined these limits, it is speculative to attempt here to do so except to venture
that, as in the justiciability area, the constitutional arguments would likely have
much in common with the prudential ones.
For example, Lincoln Mills and the bankruptcy cases can be seen as examples of
federal common lawmaking to fulfill the purposes of larger statutory schemes,
while Clealfield Trust, the admiralty cases, and Sabbalino can be viewed as protecting federal interests in areas where there is a need for national uniformity.
See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers Union of America,
451 U.S. 77 (1981); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
What is true in Erie is frequently true in run-of-the-mill diversity cases. In such
settings substantive federal common law should be unconstitutional. This view is
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The constitutional basis of Erie is important because it sets the
outermost limits of federal lawmaking power in areas where state interests may be implicated. It has been pointed out that most post-Erie
decisions have not mentioned the constitutional argument, but instead
have relied upon nonconstitutional arguments for justification.' 53 Recent commentary explains this tendency, not as an implicit rejection of
the constitutional basis of Erie, but instead as a function of the kind of
issues these later cases presented.' 54 Virtually without exception, postErie Supreme Court cases have presented issues where the differing
federal and state rules have at least arguably dual aspects involving
entirely consistent with the widely shared notions that the Constitution prohibits a
disinterested state from applying its own rule, however superior, under circumstances where to do so would interfere with the interests of other concerned states
(thus violating the full faith and credit clause) or the legitimate expectations of the
parties (thus infringing on fourteenth amendment due process rights). Cases and
commentators differ in defining disinterested fora, with some speaking in terms of
a significant contact analysis, others in terms of governmental interests, and still
others in terms of both. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 450 U.S. 971 (1981); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962) (dictum); John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145 (1932); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
The contacts analysis is of little help in discussing vertical conflicts problems
such as those raised by federal common law or the Erie doctrine. But see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 590-91 (1953) (dictum). The governmental interest
approach is more helpful. The commentator most closely associated with interest
analysis is the late Brainerd Currie. He was certain that under full faith and
credit analysis, if only one state had a legitimate claim to have its law apply, all
states would have to defer to that state's law. B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 212-13 (1963). Likewise he was certain that due process
forbids the operation of the law of a state with no legitimate interest in an issue.
See id at 193, 196, 232-33, 271. Professor Leflar is in substantial agreement. See
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 122, 125, 127 (1968).
Currie and others have argued that the constitutional aspect of the Erie doctrine is but an application of the principle that a disinterested forum cannot frustrate the policies of an interested state. See CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 443 (1963); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution. 53
Nw. U.L. REV. 427, 440-41 (1958); Weintraub, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Law Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 240 (1964). Moreover, devotees of interest
analysis rationalize the limited federal common law cases by explaining that they,
unlike Erie, involve situations where there are federal interests at stake which
must either govern or at least be weighed in the balance against whatever state
interests are at stake. See, e.g., LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 130-39
(1968).
153. From the time Erie was decided in 1938 until 1956, no mention was made of
Erie's constitutional basis at the Supreme Court level. The first reference came in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (dictum), suggesting that the
issue whether Congress might subject a legal claim to arbitration in the federal
courts might raise serious constitutional questions. The only Supreme Court majority which has discussed the constitutional holding of Erie directly in reference
to its holding was that in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
154. Ely, supra note 126; Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In
Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Redish & Phillips]; Note, The Law Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of
Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 YALE L.J. 678 (1976).
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both procedural and substantive concerns.1 55 In such settings, it is clear
that Congress has legislative jurisdiction, arising from its power to organize the federal courts, to make rules for the court's administrationI5 6
and to the extent that these powers are partially but not fully exercised,
the federal courts have at least limited responsibility to make procedural decisions consistent with the mandates of federal positive law.' 57
The courts can therefore deal with most problems on the basis of statutory construction and policy considerations without reaching the outermost limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, one can argue that
they have done so.
B.

Professor Ely's Analysis of Erie

Professor Ely suggests that once one accepts Erie's holding that
diversity jurisdiction does not authorize federal courts to make purely
155. The early cases applying Erie suggested that the dual concepts of procedure and
substance defined issue zones in which federal and state law would respectively
reign supreme. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Cities Service
Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939). Some commentators are also of the view
that the distinction constitutes the touchstone upon which the Erie rule operates.
See, e.g., Bonner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 TEX. L. REV.
509 (1962); McCoid, Hanna Y. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA.
L. REV. 884 (1965); Quigley, Congressional Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60

MICH. L. REV. 1031 (1962). From the first, however, the distinction was criticized
as unprincipled. See, e.g., COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 163-65 (1942); Tunks, Categorizationand Federalisn" "Substance"
and "Procedure"AfterErie Railroadv. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939). Af-

ter cases which decided the issue by judicial fiat, see Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1
(1941), or were concluded successfully only by ignoring the rule, see Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the Supreme Court eventually
abandoned the distinction. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965)
("The line between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context
changes"); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) ("Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure' represents the same variants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used"). A recent
article suggests that the impossibility of reconciling these dual concepts finally
forced the Supreme Court, in the Hanna case, to adopt a third category, the "arguably procedural, therefore federal" test for applying provisions of federal positive law. Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory. Three Essays in Adudication and
Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 383, 427-35 (1979).

156. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), is directly on point. The Court said:
[T~he constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by
the necessary and proper clause) carries with it congressional power to
make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in
turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though falling within
the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Id at 472.
157. This would seem to follow both from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958) and from Professor Mishkin's view that the federal common
law cases affirm the necessary "recognition of federal judicial competence to declare the governing law in an area comprising issues substantially related to an
established program of government operation." Mishkin, The Variousness of
"FederalLaw'

Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State

Rules of Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957).
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substantive decisions involving state-created rights simply because they
have a right to decide the cases, virtually all the problems of an Erietype case can be resolved as a matter of statutory construction. Ely
relies heavily upon Hanna v. Plumer 15 8 for his analysis. First, Ely
points out that there are those cases where a provision of federal positive law is directly on point. Assuming the agency which adopted the
provision had authority to do so, the federal rule would govern, despite
any state law to the contrary, because of the operation of the
supremacy clause. 59 Second, Ely states that there are cases when no
provision of federal positive law can be fairly construed as governing
the issue. In such a setting, the issues must be determined as a matter
of construction of the Rules of Decision Act.'6°
The first part of the Ely analysis gives little cause for concern, until
one realizes that tremendous problems of statutory construction accompany the determination of whether the federal rule is on point, and
what it means if it is. 16 1 Even if one gets around the problem of
158. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Hanna involved a personal injury action against the executor
of an estate filed in Massachusetts federal court. Service was effected on the executor's wife in compliance with FED. R. CIv. PRO. 4(d)(l), but the executor challenged its sufficiency in light of a state rule requiring in-hand delivery. The
Supreme Court upheld the service under the federal rule. Chief Justice Warren's
opinion began with a generalized discussion of the Erie doctrine that ended with
the suggestion that federal law should be applied unless to do so would undermine "the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 380 U.S. at 468. The opinion then cut short discussion of Erie, noting "the incorrect assumption that the
rule of Erie . . . constitutes the appropriate test of the validity and therefore the
applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure." Id. at 469-70. Warren went
on to hold that the rule was directly on point, that it was a valid exercise of the
court's rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976), and that it governed the case. 380 U.S. at 473-74.
159. 380 U.S. at 706-07 n.77. Ely's view is consistent with current notions that constitutional or congressional provisions designed to determine matters of federal judicial procedure are operative no matter what state law is. See Simler v. Conner,
372 U.S. 221 (1963) (seventh amendment jury trial right); Parsons v. Chesapeake
& Ohio R.R. Co, 375 U.S. 71 (1963) (federal change of venue statute). In instances such as these, Ely has no problem with the operation of federal positive
law under the Rules of Decision Act because that statute excepts from its coverage
provisions and requirements of the Constitution and acts of Congress.
Ely did have trouble with the assumption that a rule of court adopted under
the auspices of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), should be treated
like any act of Congress including those adopted under the Rules of Decision Act.
See Ely, supra note 126, at 718-38.
160. Ely, supra note 126, at 707-18. See supra note 121 for the text of the Rules of
Decision Act.
161. The federal rule in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), permitting substituted
service on an individual defendant under enumerated circumstances, certainly apeared on its face to cover the case then before the Court. But so also did the
ederal rules in the door closing statute cases. See Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); see also Arrowsmith v. United
Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski,
286 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1960); see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740
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whether the federal rule is on point, one still must determine whether to
construe its terms according to a nationally uniform standard or incorporate by reference standards of local law applicable to closely related
questions. The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on
whether, and under what circumstances, lower courts should employ
selective incorporation of state law or balance federal and state interests in applying federal rules.' 6 2 The lower federal courts have at least
(1980). In each of these cases the federal rules were somehow held inapposite
because direct application of them would interfere with some perceived significant
state interest or encourage forum shopping.
State courts, notably those of California, have sometimes refused to construe.
what appear to be on-point domestic substantive statutes in such a way as to displace the law of another state where to do so would frustrate the other state's
strongly held policies and upset the expectations of people acting on them. See,
e.g., Cable v. Sahara Tahoe Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 384, 155 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1979);
Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Bernkrant
v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961); People v. One
1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957). In addition, a few state
courts have refused to apply local rules, despite their "procedural" characterization, where to do so would serve no important domestic interest and would undercut the policies of the only states having substantive interests at stake. See, e.g.,
Farrier v. May Department Stores Co., 357 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973) (refusing
to apply longer local statute of limitations when concerned states had shorter
ones); Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973) (same).
The commentators have generally approved of the balancing approach to
cases like these. Some argue for "moderate and restrained interpretation" of local
laws as a means of avoiding real conflicts with foreign policies and interests. Eg.,
Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757
(1963). Some have developed a "comparative impairment" conflict principle
"subordinat[ing], in the particular case, the external objective of the state whose
internal objective will be least impaired in general scope and impact by subordination." Baxter, Choice of Law in California - a Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 719, 753 (1974). However, it is highly doubtful that there is any real difference between the two approaches. See Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 743 n.9 (1963).
162. See, e.g., De Sylvia v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-82 (1956); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1947) (dictum). The cases in the Erie line
can be read as either suggesting selective incorporation where the interests of uniformity are outweighed by local policies, or as simply authorizing a federal court
in constructing a federal rule to take into account local interests as they appear in
the particular case. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), which developed the
"federal rule on point" test, id at 471, ended rather obliquely with a note that "a
court, in measuring a Federal Rule against the standards contained in the Enabling Act and the Constitution, need not wholly blind itself to the degree to
which the rules make the character and result of the federal litigation stray from
the course it would follow in state courts .... ." Id at 473. Shortly before
Hanna, a 5-4 majority of the Court hinted how the choice of law problem should
be handled in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). The
majority upheld service of process on out-of-state defendants through service on
an in-state "agent for service of process" identified as such in the plaintiff-drawn
contract but otherwise totally unknown to the defendant and in fact on plaintiffs
payroll. The legal question was whether the in-state recipient of service was a
duly appointed agent of the defendants. Justice Black, in dissent, believed that
under state law she was not and argued that state law should be applied. Id. at
320. The majority disagreed with both propositions:
We deal here with a federal Rule, applicable to federal courts in all 50
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suggested the appropriateness of weighing federal statutory policies, including whether there is a need for uniform enforcement of them,
against the degree to which their enforcement would short-circuit state
policies or undermine significant state interests. 163 Professor Ely's "analytic framework ' ' I I is offered as a solution to confusion he claims was
engendered by mixture of "all questions respecting choices between
federal and state law . . . under the single rubric of 'the Erie doctrine.'" It is this admixture which has served to make "a major mystery out of what are really. . . distinct and rather ordinary problems of
states. But even if we were to assume that this uniform federal standard
should give way to contrary local policies, there is no relevant concept of
state law which would invalidate the agency here at issue.
Id at 316. After Hanna, in deciding how to apply federal rule 19(b)'s "equity and
good conscience" test for determining whether to dismiss or proceed without a
necessary party, the Court was a bit more helpful. The Court indicated that the
joinder question was one of federal law, but that in applying the test, the courts
should apply state law to determine what interest an outsider has. Provident
Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 125 n.22 (1968). "The
decision whether to dismiss. . . must be based on factors varying with the different cases, some factors being substantive, some procedural, some compelling by
themselves, and some subject to balancing against opposing interests." Id at 11819.
163. In a few areas the lower federal courts incorporate by reference state law to define
a term in a federal rule. For example, with regard to the federal rule that "local"
actions must be tried in the district which is the locus of the property the weight of
authority holds that the state in which the action is brought has substantive reasons for distinguishing "local" from "transitory" actions and that federal courts
must employ that state's standard in defining what is a federal "local" action. See
Chateau Lafayette Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook Nat'l Bank, 416 F.2d 301
(5th Cir. 1969); Still v. Rossville Crushed Stone Co., 370 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 918 (1967); Josevig-Kennecott Copper Co. v. James F. Howarth Co., 261 F. 567 (9th Cir. 1919); Minichiello Realty Assoc., Inc. v. Britt, 460 F.
Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1978), aff'dper curiam, 605 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1979); Central
Transport, Inc. v. Theurer, Inc. 430 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1977). The majority rule has been heavily criticized as inconsistent with Hanna and the notion that
federal venue law warrants uniform treatment, see 15 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3822 (1976), but
nevertheless seems so well entrenched it is unlikely to disappear. See Hasburgh v.
Executive Aircraft Co., 35 F.R.D. 354, 355 (D. Mo. 1964).
More generally, without attempting to incorporate by reference state law to
construe a word appearing directly in a federal statute or rule, the federal courts
have acted consistently with the Court's recommendation in Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968), suggesting that the
federal rule governs procedural issues without regard to state procedural law, but
nevertheless should be applied in individual cases in such a way as to weigh the
substantive rights of the parties under state law. For example, in determining
whether to permit an action to go forward without a "necessary party" the substantive policies of the state are now considered as "part of a balancing process." 7
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1603 (1972);
see, e.g., Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1970); Bennie v.
Pastor, 393 F.2d 1, 4 (10th Cir. 1968); Stevens v. Loomis, 223 F. Supp. 534, 536
(D. Mass 1963), aft'd, 334 F.2d 775 (lst Cir. 1964).
164. See Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1974); Ely, The Necklace, 87
HARV. L. REV. 753 (1974). Professor Chayes' article was a comment on Ely's
IrrepressibleMyth piece, and The Necklace was Professor Ely's response.
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interpretation"16' 5 involving the tenth amendment, the Enabling Act,
and the Rules of Decision Act. Of course, Ely adds, "there will be
occasions with respect to all three on which reasonable people will differ .. ."I66 A problem with this comforting assurance is that it glides
over the fact that, in construing clearly valid provisions of federal law,
there is legitimate confusion about the manner and extent to which
conflicting 67
federal and state policies and interests should be
considered. 1

But let us push aside this omission and consider that part of the
Ely framework involving questions not directly governed by federal
positive law. Professor Ely believes resolution of such questions inevitably turns on the language and putative policies underlying the Rules
165. Ely, supra note 126, at 698.
166. Id
167. For example, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958),
the Court adopted a balancing test to handle problems influenced, but not directly
controlled, by seventh amendment values and the federal interest in respecting
state law and avoiding forum shopping. Professor Ely said that the question
presented in Byrd - "whether to apply federal law, which required that a jury
decide the issue in dispute, or state law, which had a judge decide it - could have
been decided, at least if the subsequent decision in Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S.
221, 222 (1963) [seventh amendment fully applicable in diversity actions] is to be
believed, on seventh amendment grounds pure and simple." Ely, supra note 126,
at 709. This oversimplifies how Byrd might have been decided. Simler involved
the question whether federal or state law should govern in deciding if a claim was
to be deemed equitable or legal so as to know whether the seventh amendment
right to jury trial applied. In a briefper curiam opinion, the Court held the question was to be determined under federal law, and that uniformity concerns justified application of a single federal standard for distinguishing actions at law from
bills in equity. The opinion cited Byrd and other cases as indicating the strength
and vitality of federal jury trial values. But one can "believe" everything contained in Simler without accepting the notion that it makes the Byrd decision a
constitutional one. Whatever else it did say, Simler did not raise to a constitutional level all discourse in the federal courts regarding every single way in which
the power to decide cases is divided between judge and jury. In federal question
cases, many issues have been decided without the judge's believing their decisions
were directly controlled by the seventh amendment. There is no reason one
should assume similar questions arising in diversity cases should uniformly be
transformed into constitutional issues. Since the Constitution always lurks in the
background, of course Byrd could have been decided on constitutional grounds.
But in light of the fact that the constitution generally does so lurk, the question is
whether, given Simler, the Byrd Court would have so decided the case. The Byrd
court itself dodged the constitutional issue, saying it was acting "under the influence - if not the command" - of the seventh amendment. Byrd, 356 U.S. at
537. Sirler adds nothing to this; nor does it subtract from the possibility of deciding the issue on federal nonconstitutional grounds, which Byrd says a court may
do.
Ely's failure to discuss the "influence if not the command" language of Byrd
is consistent with his desire to create an analytic framework where the only
problems are ones of simple statutory construction. But, as Professor Ely himself
conceded, "[a]nalytic frameworks do not by themselves generate unequivocal answers to hard questions." Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1974). More
seriously, such frameworks can obfuscate their solution by giving them a surface
simplicity they do not warrant.

19831

Erie-Byrd Rule

465

of Decision Act. This appears to oversimplify a very complex set of
issues. Professor Ely simply ignores the last phrase of the statute which
makes the entire sentence a meaningless circularity or at the very least

renders anything one might say regarding it somewhat problematical. 168 Many of the post-Erie cases speak not of the statute, but instead
of the "policies of our federalism" 16 9 in such a way as to homogenize
the Erie opinion's separate treatment of the statutory and policy reasons for the holding of the case. Moreover, as has been pointed out
elsewhere, the Erie rule, and for that matter the Swift rule before it, has
been applied to cases in which the statute clearly did not apply, in the
same way it was applied in cases it did purport to govern, leading one
to the conclusion that the statute adds nothing and is but 70a congressional declaration of what the courts would do without it.'
But the Ely thesis is flawed in more serious ways as well. Whether
the nonconstitutional aspect of the Erie doctrine is viewed as a question
of statutory construction or policy, the real question is what policies
will be deemed relevant. Professor Ely, relying heavily upon "considered dictum"' 7 1 in Hanna regarding "the twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of laws," ' suggests that federal courts must apply state
rather than federal law whenever application of a differing rule would
tend substantially to encourage either of these evils. 173 Aside from difficulties in determining what "substantially" means, 71 this view trivial168. Note, supra note 5, at 1515 suggests that the statutory command of the Rules of
Decision Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), to make "the laws of the several states...
rules of decisions . . . in cases where they apply," is completely circular because
of the last phrase. Perhaps because this would make the statute meaningless,
others have read it as permitting a federal decisional rule only "where the Constitution, Treaties, or statutes of the United States. . . require or provide ... " See
Note, The Competence of the Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1089 (1964).
169. For example, the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), spoke
glowingly of "the policy of federal jurisdiction which Erie .. .embodies. ....
id at 101, saying that the case "expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper
distribution of judicial power between State and federal courts," id at 109, and
called this "a policy.., important to our federalism .. ."Id at 110. Justice
Harlan later spoke of Erie "as one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism
.
...Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
170. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945); Mason v. United
States, 260 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1923). In both Guaranty Trust and Mason the Court
was dealing with equitable actions, as to which the pre-1948 version of the Rules
of Decision Act did not purport to apply. The Court in both cases said the statute
was merely "declaratory" of what the Court's approach would be without it.
171. Ely, supra note 126, at 710.
172. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
173. Ely, supra note 126, at 710-18.
174. The Hanna Court used the word "substantial." 380 U.S. at 469. Professor Ely
spoke of "materially" different degrees of effort to win lawsuits and "how likely"
differing rules would change expectations of outcome, in juxtaposition to "fungible" rules with "trivial" differences. Ely, supra note 126, at 713-14. The nub of his
idea is clear. But there are still difficulties in deciding when rule differences are
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izes what others have perceived to be much more important statutory
and policy considerations: the appropriate accommodation of federal
of state rights and obligations
and state interests in 7adjudications
5
before a federal court.'
The major precedential basis for suggesting that concerns other
than forum shopping and perceived inequity should be considered
when federal positive law does not dispose of the case comes from the
Court's decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc. 176 The case involved a common law action for on the job injuries
filed by a contractor's employee against the contractor's client, the
power company. The company defended on the basis that the victim
was its employee, within the meaning of the state's workmen's compensation statute, and should be limited to his statutory remedy. Under
state law, the issue of whether the victim was a statutory employee
would be decided by the trial judge. The plaintiff argued that federal
practice rules made this issue a question for a federal jury.
The Supreme Court ruled for the plaintiff, holding that state law
should be displaced on the basis of balancing state and federal interests
in the case.'77 Although the opinion is somewhat confusing, it may be
really "material" or "trivial," and it is not clear that these difficulties are merely
occasional, as Professor Ely suggests. See id at 698. One wonders whether Professor Ely really believes that Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co, 337
U.S. 530 (1949) is one of those cases involving a problem which in "many cases"
would create "substantially more difficult" problems of compliance rather than
simply one which "ordinarily [would] affect only a lawyer's ordering of his business." Indeed, he describes this as the test but is silent as to where he comes out
on Ragan's facts. See Ely, supra note 126, at 716 n.126.
175. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 359-61. Professor Ely entirely ignores
federal procedural interests. For example, when confronted with monetary and
uniformity arguments for applying a federal rule in the context of Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) by Professor Chayes
in Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 750 (1974), his reply, briefly
stated, is that a "federal court is unable to replicate state practice only to the
Ely, The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV. 753, 757
extent it refuses to try .....
(1974).
Ely does recognize that a basic purpose of the Rules of Decision Act must
have been to assure respect for state substantive policies, but indicates this policy
will come into play only on rare occasions and relegates virtually all references to
it to footnotes. See Ely, supra note 126, at 708 n.86, 714 n.124, 716 n.126.
What Professor Ely does take seriously are the "twin aims of the Erie rule."
Of these, the anti-forum shopping language of Hanna is quite important in developing a "handy and useful touchstone" for solving Erie-type problems. Id at 710,
717. According to Ely, the more serious of the evils is "simple unfairness ... the
unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a citizen of a different
state to a body of law different from that which applies when his next door neighbor is involved in similar litigation with a co-citizen." Id at 712.
176. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
177. Id. at 537-38. Viewed in historical context, it is hard to believe that the Court in
Byrd was not developing its balancing test as a means of shoring up faith in federal statutes and rules. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 274-75; Ely, supra note 126, at
709. This conclusion is reinforced by recognizing that, since the Byrd Court apparently believed the rule differences before it were not outcome determinative,
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read as requiring a weighing of the extent to which the federal rule
would impinge upon state substantive interests and encourage forum
shopping against the extent to which applying state law would impinge
upon federal interests. 78 The Court noted that the "affirmative countervailing [federal] considerations at work" included the "federal policy
favoring jury decisions of disputed fact," developed "under the influence - if not the command - of the Seventh Amendment," as "an
essential characteristic" of "the federal system [as] . . .an independent

system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its ju-

risdiction."' 7 9 These interests outweighed upholding state substantive
policies; indeed, the Court found that none were implicated by the state
practice in question.'
Similarly, the policy of discouraging forum
shopping was not involved because the Court found there was no
strong possibility the differing rules would affect the results of the
litigation. '8 '
Professor Ely believes the short shrift given Byrd in the dictum of
the later Hanna v. Plumer'8 2 opinion suggests Byrd was sub silentio
overruled or at least confined to its facts."8 3 Thus Ely has derisively

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

356 U.S. at 535, broadening the basis of decision to include balancing of state and
federal interests must have been by conscious design. There is no question that the
rigid application of the "outcome-determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) in the 1949 trilogy of "door closing statute" cases, Ragan
v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (use of state statute of limitations
upheld to give defendants same protection in federal court as they would have in
state court); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (corporation
could not sue in Mississippi federal court without first qualifying to do business
under Mississippi law); Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (federal rule did not preempt state rule requiring plaintiff to post bond before bringing
shareholder derivative action), caused a lot of commentary regarding whether the
federal rules could withstand attack in diversity cases. Gavit, States' Rights and
FederalProcedure, 25 IND. L. REV. 1, 26 (1949); Merrigan, Erieto York to Ragan
- A Triple Play on the FederalRules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 717 (1950); see Clark,
Book Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 181, 183 (1950). Although others were less sanguine about the ability of the federal rules to survive, see, e.g., Symposium, Federal Trials and the Erie Decision, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 338 (1956), the fears
continued and in fact may have been exacerbated by the unfortunate dictum in
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) which suggested
that even federal statutes might be subject to attack under the York standard. Id
at 207-08.
See WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 275; Ely, supra note 126, at 709. Professors Redish
and Phillips have discussed at greater length the difficulty of understanding what
Byrd said. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 364-66.
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537.
Id at 536.
Id at 540.
380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Ely, supra note 126, at 717 n.120. See also Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the
"Fact"Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knellfor a Die-HardDoctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 613, 714-17 (1967). The Hanna opinion certainly seemed
to all but ignore Byrd, mentioning it only once in passing and indirectly attacking
its approach by debunking the balancing attempt of the lower court.
The Court of Appeals seemed to frame the inquiry in terms of how "important" [the state statute] is to the State .... [IIt
is not clear to what
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criticized the Fourth Circuit for continuing Byrd balancing, saying it
"seems not to have gotten the message."' 84 Subsequent cases at the
Supreme Court level and in virtually all the circuits continue to treat
Byrd balancing as alive and well, 185 suggesting that perhaps Ely rather
than the Fourth Circuit has failed to appreciate fully the issues in
question.
C. Byrd's Contribution to the Erie Rule
To argue that a significant part of Byrd's analysis has survived
Hanna does not solve very much, however, unless one understands
Byrd The decision itself is open to several ambiguities. First is the
question whether, on the state side, one is to treat the extent to which
the federal rule impinges upon state law as a separate step, preliminary
to balancing and conclusive if answered in the affirmative, or instead to
weigh this factor along with the anti-forum shopping and fairness policies against the federal interests Byrd presents. As written and applied
by a number of lower courts,
the Byrd opinion seems open to the first,
86
or two-step, approach.
Despite these rulings, the better view would be to reject the twostep approach and instead factor the substantive weight of the state's
policy into the balancing process.' 87 Federal case law since the Great
Depression is inconsistent with a notion that federal legislative jurisdic-

184.
185.

186.

187.

sort of question the Court of Appeals was addressing itself. One cannot
meaningfully ask how important something is without first asking "important for what purposes?" Erie and its progeny make clear that ...
the importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context
of ... whether . . .failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate
* . . or whether ... failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965).
Ely, supra note 126, at 717 n.130.
See discussion of Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), infra notes
240-55 and accompanying text; see also Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 369
n.74, 369-72. The writers acknowledge not having found a Byrd balancing case in
the Ninth Circuit.
Redish and Phillips correctly point out that a literal reading of Byrd requires this
approach. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 364. Byrd characterized the
initial issue as whether the state rule "is bound up with [substantive] rights and
obligations in such a way that its application in the federal court is required," 356
U.S. at 535, and indicated that balancing is appropriate when "rules ... of form
and mode. . . not bound up with rights and obligations" are at issue. Id at 53738. Among opinions which appear to adopt this approach are Miller v. Davis, 507
F.2d 308, 314 (6th Cir. 1974); Poitr v. Demarrias, 502 F.2d 23, 26 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60,
63-64 (4th Cir. 1965); Masino v. Outboard Marine Corp., 88 F.R.D. 251, 256 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 365. Cases weighing all the factors simultaneously include Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759,
765-66 (5th Cir. 1963); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir.
1960); Seaboard Finance Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507, 515 (N.D. I11.
1967);
Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 224-25 (D.R.I. 1978).
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tion is precluded by the tenth amendment within discrete zones of state
decision-making, but instead suggests that federal legislative jurisdiction extends to any item on the checklist of powers found in article I,
§ 8 of the Constitution."'8 If Hanna decided anything, it decided that
the constitutional power of Congress and the judiciary to fashion rules
of procedure are on the constitutional checklist, and when this power is
exercised the rule prevails, despite any contrary state law. The twostep approach of Byrd is inconsistent with this view. For example, if
the state rule were found to be bound up with state rights and obligations it would prevail, even if the Court concluded that the seventh
amendment or federal legislation enacted pursuant to congressional
power to set up the federal courts required that a jury decide the issue.
Surely state substantive interests cannot be found to supersede rights
validly created by the seventh amendment or the Congress; the
supremacy clause just does not cut that way.' 8 9
A second set of ambiguities in Byrd relates to what federal interests are to be put on the scales. One of these is the role federal positive
law, or the absence thereof, should play in the case. 19° With regard to
this ambiguity, the impact of Byrd is clearer. The question whether a
judge or jury should decide the issue presented by the Byrd facts could
be decided under the influence but not the command of federal positive
law and, if Byrd is to be taken as an honest opinion, it was.' 9' To
188. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-24 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1, 31-32 (1937). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (apparently resurrecting the pre-Depression "reserved powers of the states"
tenth amendment enclave theory, at least for application to very peculiar facts).
189. The nub of this argument is set forth in Ely, supra note 126, at 700-02, where the
writer attacks Justice Harlan's dissent in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring), as erroneously positing the enclave theory of the
tenth amendment. The commentary following Ely's article has generally approved of this part of his analysis. See, e.g., Last Words, supra note 136, at 1683;
Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 357-58.
190. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the "presence or absence of a specific federal
statute or rule was thought decisive by Judge Friendly and a majority of the Second Circuit," but entitled to little weight by Judge Clark of that court as well as
the Seventh Circuit. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 275. Compare Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc) (majority opinion by
Judge Friendly finding failure of federal rules to provide for amenability to service of process fatal to claim that federal service standards should supplant state
law denying amenability) with Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508,
515-16 (2d Cir. 1960) (opinion directly contra to Arrowsmith) and Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Charneski, 286 F.2d 238, 244 (7th Cir. 1960) (declaratory judgment act's apparent grant of federal remedy not dispositive when grant would initiate state substantive policy).
191. It has been pointed out that most cases applying Byrd have involved the relation
between judge and jury, such as remittitur, counsel's arguments to the jury, sufficiency of the evidence, unanimity requirements, and jury size, but that a few cases
have extended Byrd balancing to "quite analytically distinct problems such as
collateral estoppel and door closing statutes." Redish & Phillips, supra note 154,
at 371, nn.90-96. The former cases emphasize the language in Byrd discussing the
seventh amendment's "influence" and suggest that the policy of uniformity cannot
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comprehend how the seventh amendment could not apply and yet have
residual influence, one need only look to analogous federal common
law in other areas. Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills 92 decided that the federal common law of contract in labor relations was to be developed under the influence but not the command of
the Labor-Management Relations Act. Similarly, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee '" decided that a federal common law of nuisance was to be
fashioned in light of the federal interests in resolving interstate disputes. Indeed, virtually every federal common law case the Court has
handed down has found justification in part upon a federal constitutional or statutory 94background which "influenced" but did not "command" the result.

Once one begins to see the relevance of these cases to the issues in
Byrd one can understand the "influence" language. The seventh
amendment obviously has direct relevance to some issues involving
judge-jury relations within the federal courts. When it applies, it governs.'95 But there are other areas when the law governing the relationship at issue is determined by Congress, or failing its action, by the
federal courts acting in their role as administrators of the federal court
system. These include cases when federal practice with respect to
jury power i more restrictive than state practice, 196 and when it is

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

be allowed to disrupt the federal system for allocating functions between judge
and jury, while the latter rely heavily upon the Byrd opinion's reference to the
federal system as an "independent system for administering justice to litigants
who properly invoke its jurisdiction." Byrd 356 U.S. at 537. In addition, the latter cases perceive the federal mode of distributing trial functions between judge
andjry as one of many "essential characteristics" of the federal system entitled
to consideration. Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 384-89.
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
406 U.S. 91 (1972).
See, e.g., supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
This of course is the particular holding of Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
Conner may now be viewed as a particular application of the Hanna view that
when there is federal positive law on point it governs.
The seventh amendment does not guarantee the right to a nonjury trial. Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959). In 1931, the Court was confronted with a diversity case in which a state constitution assured jury consideration of an issue which, if the case were to be tried under federal procedural
standards, would be decided by the judge. The Court unanimously held that
neither the Conformity Act nor the Rules of Decision Act required application of
the state procedure. Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931). However, in denying the applicability of the state constitution, the Court stated:
The controlling principle governing the decision on the present question
is that state laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a
federal court. The function of the trial judge in a federal court is not in
any sense a local matter, and state statutes which would interfere with
the appropriate performance of that function are not binding upon the
federal court. ...
Id There is little reason to believe that Herron has been undermined by Erie and
its progeny. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 448-50. In the first place. the pre-Erie rule
of Swift had, on the basis of construction of the word "laws" in the Rules of
Decision Act, excluded from statutory coverage state common law rules in areas
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less. 191 If Congress does not like what the courts are doing, it can overrule their decisions, as it has in the past, both with regard to other jury
issues 98 and issues quite remote from them. 99 Absent congressional
legislation, however, it is up to the courts to try to fashion modes of
proceeding consistent with the Constitution and the congressional mandate that they operate the system.
The federal common law created in Byrd is consistent with the
values the Court perceived as emanating from the seventh amendment.
It is consistent with the way in which federal trial judges have decided,
in the absence of congressional legislation to the contrary, to apportion
power between judge and jury. And it is consistent with the congressional mandate, implicit in the very creation of diversity jurisdiction,
that the courts responsibly exercise the judicial power of the United
States.
of national concern. The Herron case, involving as it did construction of different
language in the Rules of Decision Act (after all, in Herron the state constitution
was not judge-made) was in no sense a Swft?-type decision and should survive
Erie. Moreover, the Byrd opinion itself cited Herron with approval and even went
so far as to quote the language set forth above in support of the notion that judgejury power allocation in the federal courts is exclusively a matter of federal concern. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538-39.
197. This, of course, is the Byrd case itself.
198. For example, prior to the enactment of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1866 (1976), federal jurors were selected largely on the same
basis as their counterparts in the states where the federal courts sat. In 1946, the
Supreme Court held illegal a federal trial judge's exclusion of daily wage earners
from consideration for jury duty. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946). The Court found the exclusion inconsistent with the "American tradition
of trial by . . . an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community."
Id at 220. The decision was not based on the seventh amendment, however, but
rather on the Court's "power of supervision over the administration of justice in
the federal courts." Id. at 225. Because it was a common law, nonconstitutional
decision, it could be refined and modified by a subsequent congressional enactment. That is precisely what happened when Congress passed the Jury Selection
Act. While the statute continues the federal policy of assuring that juries be "selected at random from a fair cross section of the community . . . wherein the
court convenes," 28 U.S.C. § 1861, and contains, inter alia, a general prohibition
against exclusion on account of "economic status," id. § 1862, it nevertheless contains numerous exemptions and exclusions which assure in many cases an unrepresentative jury pool.
199. Procedural examples are legion. In 1958, Congress enacted a provision creating
dual citizenship for corporations having states of charter different from their main
places of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1976). The statute was aimed at eliminating cases like Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), where a local business reincorporated in a
neighboring state for the sole purpose of creating diversity jurisdiction. In 1964,
Congress further revised the statute to eliminate from the diversity jurisdiction
direct actions against out-of-state insurers when both the victim and the tortfeasor
were citizens of the same state, thus reversing the rule of Lumbermen's Mutual
Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1948). In 1948, taking its cue from Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), but going beyond mere codification of the Gulf Oil
rule, see Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955), Congress enacted the
federal change-of-venue statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
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THE SCOPE OF FEDERAL PROCEDURAL COMMON
LAW IN LIGHT OF BYRD.

The federal common law of procedure authorized by Byrd is
supreme when the federal interests it raises outweigh the countervailing
policies against forum shopping and undue incursions upon state interests, in much the same way that the specialized federal common law
outlined previously is supreme. There are, however, differences. First,
of course, is the question of scope. The federal common law of Byrd
does not operate in state courts, as does the substantive federal common law of Lincoln Mills or ClearfieldTrust. This is true for the same
reasons that the seventh amendment, federal jury selection rules, and
federal venue statutes do not apply in state courts.
Second, the federal court's power to employ federal procedural
common law rules to displace state rules is unlikely to be exercised
absent federal substantive interests. Fundamentally, this is true because procedural law is inherently adjective. Since like cases should
obtain like treatment, and matters of form are generally given less importance than matters of substance, it is not surprising that federal
judges are reticent to uphold the majesty of federal conventions in the
face of countervailing considerations of fairness and substantive policy.
Nevertheless, Byrd forces the choice upon them. The balance of this
article will consider how this choice should be exercised, first taking up
the question of what to do when state substantive policies are not at
stake, and second considering what to do when they are.
A. Scope of FederalProceduralCommon Law In the Absence of
State Substantive Interests
The procedural law created in Byrd must be extended beyond the
narrow confines of judge-jury relations.2 " This is clearest when no significant state substantive interests are implicated. Absent them, the
200. In seeking to reconcile recent Supreme Court decisions on Erie questions, one can
note, as have Professors Redish and Phillips, "perhaps the Supreme Court wishes
to establish an enclave for judge-jury relations governed by Byrd within the
" Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 372 n.98. The
broader Hanna test ..
authors cite Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648 (1977) (per curiam),
where the Court referred to both Byrd and Hanna as somehow supporting the
notion that the allocation of power to both trial and appellate courts in reviewing
the size of jury verdicts is, in the federal system, "a matter of federal law ,.. "
Id at 649-50. In other recent Erie-type cases, the Court has been content to employ Hanna-like concern with the policy against unfair judicial administration
without any attempt to "balance" federal and state interests. See, e.g., Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 753 (1980) (reaffirming Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949)); Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v.
Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) (per curiam) (reaffirming Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941)). Since both Walker and Day & Zimmermann
are in part justified on stare decisis, and since neither explicitly dealt with the
inconsistencies between Hanna and Byrd (indeed, neither even mentioned the latter case) the theory that the Court views judge-jury relations a Byrd enclave
within a Hanna-grounded universe is highly speculative.
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only countervailing interests to the dominance of federal procedural

law are the policies against forum shopping and inequitable administration of law. These are not in themselves state policies. Instead, they
are policies of the federal courts, enunciated in Erie and its progeny,
relevant primarily to guide federal choice of law decisions in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction.
Forum shopping alone cannot be viewed as an unmitigated evil. If
Congress viewed it as such, it could easily eliminate it simply by abol20 1
ishing diversity jurisdiction. The fact that the jurisdictional statutes
permit it suggests that, at least for some purposes, it is believed to be
highly desirable.20 2 Most of the commentators seem to agree that forum shopping is bad only if it leads to unfairness, the kind of "equal
203
protection problems which [originally] troubled the Court in Erie.There seems to be some agreement that since forum shopping is not
itself a per se evil, the main reason for using it is that it provides a
handier touchstone than "unfair discrimination" for determining in
which cases state laws should prevail.2° But surely congressional retention of diversity jurisdiction, with all its attendant weaknesses and
in the face of the myriad problems the Erie decisions have uncovered
over the years, suggests that forum
shopping should at most be a warn20 5
ing signal and not a litmus test.

201. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1), 1441(a)(b) (1976).
202. For a modem discussion of the virtues and vices of diversity jurisdiction, see Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction.- A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV.
317 (1977). Chief Justice Marshall's historic justification for it was that it assured
out-of-state litigants a neutral forum and allayed fears of prejudice from their
opponents' home state courts. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 87 (1809). While this justification has been directly disputed, see
Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 49297 (1928), and has its detractors, Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 869, 976 (1931), it is still the generally accepted argument for diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Erie, 304 U.S. at 74; Hanna,
380 U.S. at 467. However, since both the original jurisdiction statute and the
removal statute permit jurisdiction in theoretically neutral venues, and since the
former also permits in-state citizens to invoke it and thereby escape their own
state courts, one must conclude that either there was careless drafting or that other
justifications beyond those of Chief Justice Marshall's carried some weight. One
such explanation is a wide-spread belief that federal courts are simply better than
their state counterparts and that their operation will provide better justice and
also spur state rules reform. See generaly WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 90-91.
203. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. See Ely, supra note 126 at 712; McCoid, Hanna v.
Plumer. The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884, 889 (1965); Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 373.
204. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 126, at 710, 717; Comment, Hanna v. Plumer. An Expanded Concept of Federal Common Law -A Requiem for Erie?, 1966 DUKE L.J.
142, 164-65. In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), the Court
admitted that no danger of forum shopping existed but said state law should be
followed to avoid inequitable administration of the laws. Id at 753.
205. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), where the Court stated:
"Outcome-determination" analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. Indeed, the message of [Guaranty Trust] itself is that choices between state and federal law are to be made not by application of any
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Unfair discrimination seems at first glance a more serious evil. It
is fundamental that like cases should be treated the same, and that, as
the Hanna Court put it, "it would be unfair for the character or result
of litigation to differ materially because the suit had been brought in a
federal court."2 °' This argument feeds back into the forum shopping
concern. It has been suggested that if one party would lose, or even
have to work harder to win, because of rule differences, he would necessarily be disadvantaged vis-a-vis others whose situations are similar

but for the availability to his opponent of a federal forum. This shift in

advantages is the unfairness Hanna aimed to eliminate.2" 7
But this argument is overdrawn. To say that one party is disadvantaged, and the other advantaged, because of the operation of diversity jurisdiction, is not necessarily to say that there exists an "unfair" or
"inequitable" or invidiously "discriminatory" administration of law.
All one may really conclude from an advantage/disadvantage analysis
is that a competent lawyer would take advantage of it and forum shop.
To conclude that an "advantage" caused someone to lose or be burdened "unfairly" requires inquiry as to why he lost or was burdened. If
the justification for the burden is great enough, none would call the
impact "unfair."2 ° Moreover, on the face of it, federal procedural polautomatic "litmus paper" criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.
Id at 466-67 (citations omitted). Certainly Hanna later identified avoidance of
forum shopping as one of those underlying policies. Id at 467. But the same
Court was rather cavalier about the forum shopping its Rules Enabling Act analysis permitted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to encourage, suggesting that
the Court attached little moral authority to the policy against forum shoppingper
se. Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 377 n.121. Even Professor Ely, who
heartily approves of the "re-juvenated outcome determination test" he finds in
Hanna, Ely, supra note 126, at 717-18, agrees that the likelihood of forum shopping at most "may turn out to be a handy touchstone for identifying those situations exhibiting the evils against which the [Rule of Decision] Act was
directed..., " id at 710, evils which he identifies as unfair administration and
infringement on state substantive policies. Id at 712, 716 n. 126.
206. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
207. Professor Ely writes:
What Erie mentioned, and Hanna picked up, was simple unfairness. . .. The point of the Hanna dictum is that it is difficult to find
unfairness. . . whose elimination would justify disrupting a federal
court's routine, when the difference between the federal and state rules is
trivial, when their requirements are essentially [the same]. . . . The
Court therefore suggested by its examples that a federal court may adhere to its own rules in diversity cases insofar, but only insofar, as they
are neither materially more or less difficult for the burdened party to
comply with than their state counterparts, nor likely to generate an outcome different from that which would result were the case litigated in
the state court system and the state rules followed.
Ely, supra note 126, at 712-14 (citations omitted).
208. Perhaps Professor Ely is an exception. He says that the Court "suggested by its
examples" cases illustrating these types of unfairness, vaguely citing in support of
his proposition two pages from the Hanna opinion. See id. at 714 n. 122 (citing
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468-69 (1965)). The pages cited do not support
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icies seem capable, at least in certain circumstances, of providing such

justification.
None of the Supreme Court's Erie decisions, except perhaps
Hanna, suggests that in no instance should federal procedural law control.2" Even Justice Frankfurter, who suggested that a federal court
sitting in diversity was "only another court of the State" and developed
the "outcome determinative" test' 10 upon which Hanna built, was unwilling to issue a blanket refusal ever to apply federal procedural standards in diversity cases. Indeed, in the very case which announced the
test, he explicitly refused to sacrifice, to state rules of local practice, the
remedial flexibility of a federal judge sitting in equity - finding such
flexibility inherent in and essential to federal jurisdiction. 2 "
Justice Frankfurter's reference to federal independence in determining the scope of federal equitable remedies is but one example of
situations in which state law should not be allowed to interfere with
essential federal judicial functions. There are dozens of other contexts
in which federal interests might well be deemed paramount. Consider,
for example, narrow issues of judicial administration. In one situation,
an attorney might find that the United States Marshal Service is more
efficient and speedy in making service than the local sheriff, or that the
federal district court's jury dockets are noticeably shorter than those of
the county courts in the district. Such considerations might lead to forum shopping, but no one would suggest the federal trial judge change
the practice of his court to eliminate the possibility. Another example
21 2
is the operation of federal venue statutes. Both Livingston v. Jefferson

209.

210.
211.

212.

the notion that differential treatment is inherently unfair. The Court was explaining why the outcome determination test, applied literally, was overbroad, and justified a retreat to a "forum shopping-unfair administration" test.
Erie itself involved substantive state and federal laws, and for a variety of reasons
is inapposite to the present debate. First, when state substantive policies are implicated there is heightened reason to fear that the parties will perceive that the
case's result turned on which judge heard the case rather than on the merits. Second, in Erie itself, there could be no justification for the differential impact, because the federal rule involved, one of general common law, was really beyond
the power of the federal courts to create or enforce.
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945).
Id Nor should Hanna itself necessarily be viewed as suggesting there can never
be a nonstatutory federal reason adequate to displace application of a differing
state rule. The modified outcome determination test which derives from its dictum was developed only as a side effect (and not necessarily a well thought out
one) of the Court's effort to cut Justice Frankfurter's outcome analysis down to
size. The Court never purported to grapple with the problem which would arise
and be dealt with in Byrd - but instead went on simply to show why outcome
analysis was never meant to govern cases like Hanna Moreover, if the Court had
meant to overrule Byrd, it could have done so explicitly. Instead, it simply ignored the precedent. But since the Court may not have perceived the immediate
question--the manner in which notice is given a defendant--as involving an essential federal judicial function, ignoring Byrd should not necessarily be construed as overruling it.
15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411). In this case, Chief Justice Marshall,
sitting on circuit, imported into federal venue law the English rule that certain
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and Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert2" 3 were, in their day, federal common law
cases. Their holdings have been partially incorporated into federal
statutes, but the doctrines retain continuing vitality independent of
these statutes.21 4 Suppose a plaintiff wanted to sue a diverse defendant
on a federally "local" action under circumstances where the property
was located in Canada, and by far the more convenient forum was situated there. Should the plaintiff be able to sue the defendant in his
home state which does not recognize local actions at all and which has
failed to adopt the doctrine of forum non conveniens? The federal "local" action rule might not govern the issue,21 5 and certainly the federal
change of venue statute would not.21 6 But the federal venue statutes
claims theretofore characterized as "local" could only be brought in the place
where the property was located. Though Marshall thought it anomalous, he felt
bound by the precedents to extend the "local action" characterization beyond
strictly in rem proceedings to such in personam actions as trespass quare clausum
fregit. Id at 665. The Marshall rule has been adopted as a gloss limiting the
application of the general venue statute to transitory or nonlocal actions. Casey v.
Adams, 102 U.S. 66, 67 (1880); see 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
213. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Here the Court approved a discretionary dismissal, on the
basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine, of a tort action filed in the Southern
District of New York even though all conceded that the filing was proper under
the venue statutes. Id at 504.
214. The United States Code now gives implicit recognition to the rule of Livingston.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1976). In 1948, just after Gulf Oil was decided, Congress
enacted the federal change of venue statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). While the
statute was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it
has been held that the statutory standards for transfer and the common law standards for dismissal differ slightly, though involving consideration of similar criteria. See, e.g., Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955); Parsons v.
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 71, 72 (1963) (per curiam). Since statutory transfer is a less draconian remedy than the common law dismissal, it is generally easier to obtain, and the statute has largely superseded the common law
doctrine. Forum non conveniens dismissals remain an option, however, in those
rare instances when federal venue is monumentally inconvenient and the only
alternative fora are state courts or foreign tribunals. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235 (1981); see, e.g., Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1960).
215. The weight of authority seems to be in favor of having state law determine
whether an action should be classified as local or not. See, e.g., Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669-70 (1892) (dictum); Still v. Rossville Crushed Stone Co.,
370 F.2d 324, 325 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 918 (1967); Peyton v.
Desmond, 129 F. 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1904). These cases are inconsistent with the view
of Chief Justice Marshall, who said in Livingston that he was "decidedly of opinion" that the issue was exclusively one for federal courts to decide. Livingston, 15
F. Cas. at 665. Moreover, the cases have recently been rejected by a number of
courts on the grounds that federal venue presents issues of exclusive federal concern warranting uniform federal standards. See, e.g., Pasos v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 229 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1956); Minichiello Realty Assoc., Inc. v. Britt,
460 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1978), affdper curiam, 605 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1979);
Central Transport, Inc. v. Theurer, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
The Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 108 n. 10 (1972), suggested
that the nuisance action therein approved might be filed under the general venue
statutes, but since the case was not a diversity action its application was questionable. Most recently, in Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183
n.15 (1979), the Supreme Court appeared to leave the issue open.
216. The transfer statute, of course, only permits transfer to anotherfederalcourt. 28
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themselves represent an effort, albeit incomplete, to apportion federal
litigation among courts in a consistent, economical, convenient, and
fair way. A refusal to apply the federal common law of venue to facts
such as these, because this in some way would cause forum shopping,
would seem an outrageous intrusion of state procedural policies upon
an area of independent federal interest. Under the influence, though
certainly not the command, of this statutory scheme the federal court
would have ample justification to remit the plaintiff to either the local
courts or the Canadian forum.2 17
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). Despite claims of Yankee imperialism, there are as yet
no American federal courts in Canada.
217. In cases in which a section 1404(a) transfer is unavailable, the Supreme Court has
four times found it unnecessary to decide whether federal courts must follow local
law or apply for themselves their own law on the issue of whether to dismiss for
reason of forum non conveniens. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248
n.13 (1981); Koster v. American Lumbermens Mutual Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518,
529-30 (1947); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947); Williams v.
Green Bay & W.R.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1946). Koster suggests its probable answer, however, in describing the problem as involving the "autonomous
administration of the federal courts in the discharge of their own judicial duties
.
330 U.S. at 520 n.l.
Most of the lower courts which have had to deal with the question have concluded that a federal court should employ its own standard for determining
whether to dismiss, independent of what the state courts would do. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 313 (6th Cir. 1974); Thomson v. Palmieri, 355 F.2d
64, 66 (2d Cir. 1966) (dictum); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65
(4th Cir. 1965); Shulman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp.
833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Both Miller and Szantay, the latter of which involved a
state door-closing statute, employed Byrd balancing in deciding to hear cases the
state courts would have rejected. In each case the court found that nationally
uniform application of the federal venue statutes and other federal policies outweighed whatever federal interest there was in avoiding forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. In addition, the courts in Szantay and
Shulman argued that refusal to accept the cases because of the parties' citizenship
would be inconsistent with the purpose of diversity jurisdiction - to avoid discriminations against nonresidents. The Thomson court's analysis was less developed, but led the court to believe that forum non conveniens issues are
"procedural" and hence fall outside the Erie rule.
The law is even clearer that in cases where the alternative forum is a federal
one to which a section 1404(a) transfer is available, the federal court may freely
ignore local rules of forum non conveniens. In Parsons v. Chesapeake & Ohio
R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 71 (1963) (per curiam), the Supreme Court said that a prior
state dismissal of a claim on the basis of forum non conveniens could "never serve
to divest a district judge of the discretionary power vested in him" by the transfer
statute. Id at 73-74 (emphasis added). While Parsons involved an FELA action,
rather than diversity jurisdiction, and technically ruled only on the resjudicata
impact of the state dismissal, its conclusion that section 1404(a) transfer was not
governed by state law because the two are governed by different considerations,
together with its emphatic "never," has led diversity courts to ignore state forum
non conveniens rules in considering whether to retain jurisdiction or transfer
under section 1404(a). See, e.g., Lapides v. Donner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 893 (E.D.
Mich. 1965); see also Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955) (state
refusal to take suit for forum non conveniens reasons "does not control a federal
court, since Congress has explicitly legislated in that field...").
The section 1404(a) cases might now be viewed as consistent with the holding
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To say that there are cases in which federal procedural interests
should be paramount is, of course, not always to make them so. In the
case hypothecated, as in the federal common law cases generally, there
is either a strong federal policy, a concrete federal pecuniary interest, a
justifiable sense of the need of uniform federal standards, or a sense
that the problem implicates no state interests-thus suggesting the propriety of applying federal and not local standards. Such factors are not
always present. When they are not, deference should be paid to local
law. Even when federal interests are present, the interest in upholding
the independent operation of the federal rule may be vindicated without unduly encouraging forum shopping or a sense of invidious discrimination by the adoption of alternative mechanisms within federal
judicial control. For example, in Byrd itself, the Court suggested federal jury control devices might mitigate whatever tendency the decision
to allow the jury to address the "statutory employee" issue might have
toward encouraging forum shopping.21 s
Recognition that the choice of law issue is a federal one does not
in itself necessitate adoption of the federal rule. Recall that in
Cleafield Trust Co. v. United States,21 9 United States v. Standard Oil
Co.,2 2 ° and Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 221 the
Supreme Court indicated there was a two step process: to decide first
whether there was federal judicial power to adopt a federal rule, and
second whether this rule should be a nationally uniform one or incorporate by reference local rules. The decisions in the door-closing
cases 222 suggest that in the absence of any federal procedural interest,
federal rules of positive law will be construed narrowly to permit the
operation of state rules in such a way as to eliminate the incentive to
forum shop in the federal courts.
Interest analysis of this type might indicate similar results when
the federal rule is not founded in positive law but is judge-made. Take,
for example, the opposite of the example set out above regarding federal venue rules. If the state rules for local actions and forum non con-

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) that when federal positive law is on
point, it governs, despite any state law to the contrary. Id. at 471. The decisions,
however, should not be so limited. The transfer statute codified and revised existing law to permit federal judges more discretion to limit plaintiffs initial venue
choices than they had enjoyed under the federal forum non conveniens doctrine.
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). If state law were the governing
principle, the federal court would have to transfer or dismiss whenever the state
courts would dismiss. But that is not what cases like Willis and Lapides mandate.
In those cases, the courts retained jurisdiction and refused to transfer the cases. In
both holding and rationale, these cases are consistent with the notion that the
federal forum non conveniens doctrine may be applied independently of what the
state courts might do.
Byrd, 356 U.S. at 540.
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
332 U.S. 301 (1947).
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
See supra note 177.
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veniens were more inclusive than the federal ones, then unlike the
example above federal enforcement of the narrower federal rules
would tend to encourage federal forum shopping.
Close examination of the interests involved lead to the conclusion
that the state rules should be applied. Federal pocketbook interests
certainly are not well served by allowing federal courts to become
clogged with state cases when the state courts would be closed. The
policy against entertaining litigation in monumentally inconvenient
fora, which underlies both the local action rule and the forum non conveniens doctrine, is not impaired by utilizing local rules designed to
enforce similar policies even more stringently. While one can argue
that federal venue certainly presents a federal question and that generally such questions should receive uniform application, the value of
uniformity is outweighed by the fact that it would be obtained at substantial cost to federal policies against forum shopping. Since there is
nothing else to be put on the "federal" side of the scales - no vindication of an important federal policy - and there is something more to
be added to the "state" side - the wasteful use of federal jurisdiction
- the answer seems to lie in favor of applying local law.22 3
It must be conceded that the foregoing arguments are fairly debatable. It may be hard to conclude that there is no impairment of an
"important" federal policy, or that the use of federal jurisdiction would
be "wasteful." One may argue that Congress, by creating federal diversity jurisdiction and venue rules, impliedly indicated to the courts a
federal policy interest in allowing plaintiffs, whose cases qualify, to invoke that jurisdiction and choose their venues under uniform federal
standards. It also is hard to distinguish the above example, where there
is no "important" federal policy, from Byrd where the Court obviously
did find one.
This argument suggests the slippery nature of any Erie analysis.2 24
223. Read superficially, most of the federal forum non conveniens caselaw seems inconsistent with the text. In Thomson v. Palmieri, 355 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1966) and
Shulman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), for instance, the federal court assumed jurisdiction, despite local door-closing rules, in order to help nonresident American plaintiffs find an American forum in which to sue foreign defendants. Moreover, other courts refused to
transfer or dismiss when the impact of such action would have been to bifurcate
the plaintiffs' cases because of service of process problems in various alternative
fora. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965); Lapides v.
Donner, 248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965). However, the judges in these cases
found independent federal policies favoring assumption of jurisdiction. In the
foreign defendant cases, they were concerned with upholding the policy of diversity jurisdiction against discrimination of nonresidents, while in the transfer cases
they were concerned with federal policies favoring liberal joinder and opposing
piece-meal litigation. Absent such special concerns, the Fourth Circuit at least
would abide by the door-closing rules of the state where the federal court sits. See
Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 738, 748 (4th Cir. 1980); Bumgarder
v. Keene Corp., 593 F.2d 572, 573 (4th Cir. 1979).
224. As Professor Wright has indicated, Byrd balancing is difficult because the case
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It is patent that federal common law cases require this sort of close
judgment, and that reasonable people have quibbled about particular
judgments for a long time22 5 and likely will do so in the future. It is so
with all line drawing. The admission that it is difficult to render consistent
judgments, 226 however, does not eliminate the necessity for doing
227
it.

B.

Scope of FederalProceduralCommon Law When State
Substantive Interests Exist

Part of the wisdom of the retreat of Erie from Swift lies in its recognition that federal procedure, like all procedure, is primarily adjective law, and that its purposes do not include initiating rules of
substantive rights and obligations. The assumption has been that the
state rule in question lacks substantive content. This assumption is not
always viable. A rule may be characterized as substantive in at least
three ways. First, there are those rules which are designed to have direct impact on the wa% people function and organize their lives outside
the litigation setting. 2 A second category of substantive rules, only a

225.
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fails to tell us what is to be put on the scales, much less how much each element
weighs. WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 275. The caselaw defining the pre-Guaranty
"substance-procedure" dichotomy was similarly frustrating. See supra note 155.
For an interesting debate among eminent scholars regarding this same dichotomy
in the context of defining the application of rules promulgated under the Rules
Enabling Act see Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1974) and Ely,
The Necklace, 87 HARV. L. REV. 753 (1974). Professor Ely believes that the modified outcome test of Hanna's dictum helps resolve the difficulties of Byrd balancing, but has to admit that there are cases in which it does not work. Ely, supra
note 126, at 716 n.126, 717.
For example both Friendly, supra note 5, at 410, and Note, supra note 5, at 152631, criticize the holding in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943).
Frustration with the Ely analysis has led to two different kinds of responses. On
the one hand, some, like myself, believe that the modified outcome analysis fails
to properly account for legitimate federal procedural interests and substantive
state concerns. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 360, 372, 377, 380.
Others, frustrated by the uncertainty of even the modified outcome analysis of
Professor Ely, would harken back to the old substance-procedure dichotomy, but
avoid its pitfalls by concluding that in cases not covered by a federal rule, the
federal courts should always apply any state law which is "arguably substantive."
See, e.g., Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory." Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383 (1979). Such talismanic solutions have failed in the
past, and they likely will fail in the future.
Professor Trautman concedes the difficulty of balancing in all choice of law contexts but nevertheless recommends it in the federal common law context. See
Trautman, supra note 62, at 107-08, 113-14.
Obvious examples of such rules are those banning common law marriage which
have among their functions the requirement of a certain amount of ceremony in
order to assure considered decision-making in matters the State may deem highly
significant for the individuals involved. Less obviously, rules like the statute of
limitations, to the extent they give putative wrongdoers a sense of repose, may be
considered substantive because they encourage the wrongdoers to be able to plan
their lives prospectively without fear of being haunted by their pasts and discour-
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shade different from the first, are designed to discourage wrongful use
of the litigation process. 229 Finally, there are various rules, such as
those defining the elements of causes of action or the classification of
particular types of litigants, which may indicate a state decision to
favor one class of litigants over another simply because the state believes substantive justice requires the rule.2 30 The precise issues in
Erie23' and Palmer v. Hoffman 232 were substantive in this sense.
Determining whether, and to what extent, a particular state rule
implicates such substantive state interests is in itself a difficult matter.
Part of the reason is that the state organs which make the rules often
fail to articulate their reasons for doing so. This should not be surprising, however, in view of the fact that, for state purposes, there may be
little reason for them to do so.
Once a federal court has honestly and sensitively assessed a state
law's purposes and found them substantive, it still must evaluate what
weight to accord them and the extent to which enforcement of the competing federal rule will undermine these purposes. Such judgments are
inherently problematical. The absence of state evidence on these issues
should not be all that significant, since in an Erie-type case the ultimate
import of the nature and significance of the state law's purposes and the

229.

230.

231.

232.

age their victims from harping on ancient wrongs. Other examples would be rules
defining claims like defamation or various defenses like privilege, which may be
seen as encouraging free speech or certain types of relationships. These are all
classic examples of what Justice Harlan referred to as rules which "substantially
affect those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional
system leaves to state regulation." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring); see Ely, supra note 126, at 725-26.
Examples are the procedural limitations on shareholder derivative actions or actions for fraud, which have as their purpose the elimination of strike suits, or the
"domestication" rules for foreign corporations, which have as their function the
prevention of evasion of service of process by foreign corporations doing business
in the state. Justice Harlan himself felt that Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), which required the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative action to follow the state rule of filing a security bond before he proceeded in
federal court, could best be rationalized on the basis that the state statute was
substantive. The state statute, he said, "was meant to inhibit small stockholders
from instituting 'strike suits,' and thus it was designed and could be expected to
have a substantial impact on private primary activity." Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 477 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). It is interesting to note that Justice
Harlan was the attorney for the respondent in Cohen.
In this class of cases one would add state rules which, for instance, allocate burdens of pleading, production, or persuasion in a certain way for particular classes
of litigants. The majority in Byrd spoke of rules which "tend to benefit one party
more than the other." Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536.
The railroad claimed that under state law plaintiff should be classed as a mere
trespasser, and hence entitled to relief only if the railroad's conduct was proven to
be wanton or wilful. Plaintiff sought application of federal common law because
under it he would be classified as a licensee and needed only to prove simple
negligence. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69-70.
318 U.S. 109 (1943). There, under state law, plaintiff bore the burdens of production and persuasion on the issue of contributory negligence, while under the "general" law of tort these burdens fell upon the defendants. See id. at 117-19.
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extent to which they might be frustrated by operation of federal law is
relevant only to federalism issues peculiar to the federal court. More
disturbing is the unprincipled and seemingly inconsistent way in which
the federal courts seem to characterize some state rules as substantive
or not, and weighty or insignificant without any apparent attempt to
seriously divine the type of impact the rule might have.233
There are two fundamental challenges to the process of Byrd balancing when attempting to determine if state substantive law should
control. The first is that once federal judges are invited to balance federal interests in applying their own rules with the policies against forum
shopping and undermining state interests, they will quickly begin to
"find" federal interests and balance away forum shopping and state
policy concerns. The tendency of judges in choice of law situations
to follow the "better law,",234 often meaning their own domestic
233. In Byrd the Court decided that the state's use of a judge rather than a jury served
no significant state policy because it was unable to find any statement to that effect
from any relevant state sources. Byrd 356 U.S. at 536. Whicher's wry comment
followed:
The Court thus deduce[s] the South Carolina law, which it purportedly
applies as the basis of its opinion, from the silence of the South Carolina
courts on a point they were never called upon to decide. In other words,
the Court avoids application of the rule of the [state] case simply by
creating a new and convenient principle of South Carolina law for the
purpose.
Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment." A Suggested Resolution
of Their Conflict, 37 TEX. L. REV. 549, 556 n.39 (1959) (emphasis in original). The
same problem has come up in other contexts. The Fourth Circuit could not divine
from any state sources the purposes of the South Carolina door-closing statute in
Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64-65 (4th Cir. 1965), and Judge
Clark could find none from state sources in Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320
F.2d 219, 235 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J.,dissenting), leading each to conclude the
state goals were not substantive.
Some manipulation is inevitable, with federal as well as state rules. For instance, the Arrowsmith majority limited the application of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3)
to the manner of service because it could find no affirmative evidence the rule was
meant to govern amenability, 320 F.2d at 225-27, ignoring the possibility that the
question of where a suit might be brought in the federal system could implicate
federal interests and thus justify application of an independent body of federal
law. Cf.28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) (The federal change of venue statute).
234. Professor Leflar is the most outspoken commentator among those writing on horizontal conflict of laws issues in favor of allowing judges to consider, among other
things, which law is preferable.
If choice of law were purely a jurisdiction-selecting process, with courts
first deciding which state's law should govern and checking afterward to
see what that state's law was, this consideration would not be present.
Everyone knows that this is not what courts do, nor what they should do.
Judges know from the beginning between which rules of law, and not
just which states, they are choosing. A state's "interest" in a set of facts
can be analyzed only by reference to the content of the competing rules
of law. Choice of law is not wholly a choice between laws as distinguished from a choice between jurisdictions, but partly it is.
Leflar, Conflicts Law. More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,54 CAL. L. REV.
1584, 1587 (1966). Other writers, while eschewing Leflar's better law approach,
come very close to adopting it by suggesting that courts should feel free to aban-
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rules, 235

is suggested as putative evidence of what judges will do if one
allows them the freedom to decide what goes on the scales and how
much the items weigh.
A few lower court decisions which quite debatably apply Byrd,
provide some evidence of the validity of these arguments.2 36 But the
list of lower court cases applying Byrd provides scant support for the
view that there has been wholesale manufacture of bogus federal interests or a return to wanton forum shopping or reckless overriding of
state interests. Given the current retreat from judicial activism by the
Supreme Court and the natural inclination of federal judges to abhor
forum shopping which will clog their dockets, it would be remarkable
indeed to see these fears realized.
The second objection to Byrd balancing is that it makes the results
of Erie-type cases less predictable and certain than would be true if one
were simply to apply the test of Hanna v. Plumer.237 Indeed, there is no
don "anachronistic" rules in favor of those which clearly reflect objectively verifiable trends in the law. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF
LAWS 270-71, 273-75, 373-76 (2d ed. 1980) (suggesting that courts should generally
apply rules favoring plaintiffs in tort because of the desirability of spreading loss
through insurance, abandon rules such as those preventing survivorship of tort
claims, and presume the validity of contracts if any contact state would validate it
and refuse to enforce invalidating rules such as spendthrift statutes); see also
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 352-54 (1962). Leflar's
open espousal of a better law approach to conflicts problems has been adopted in
a number of states. See, e.g., Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550
S.W.2d 453 (1977); Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973);
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d
468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
235. In Tower v. Schwabe, 284 Or. 105, 585 P.2d 662 (1978), the court rejected the
better law approach because it "would result in the application of the law of the
forum in each case because every forum thinks it has created the best rule of law
.... "d. at 110, 585 P.2d at 664. Professor Leflar conceded that "a search for
the better rule of law may lead a court almost automatically to its own lawbooks."
LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 219 (1968). Indeed, he felt constrained to
note that both Ehrenzweig and Brainerd Currie had "suggested that this is the
dominant theme in the entire choice-of-law process, the basic rule." Id at 218. In
Leflar's view, the desire to apply the better rule was only one of five enumerated
factors he felt should guide judges, id.at 245, and he made it clear that he was not
recommending slavish adherence to forum law. Id. at 218-19, 254-59.
236. See, e.g.. Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979) (enforcing state rule
making participation in state malpractice arbitration procedures condition precedent to right of action, despite the fact that this substantially precluded plaintiff's
access to a federal forum and interfered with his right to jury trial under independent federal standards), Allstate Ins. Co. v. Charneski, 280 F.2d 238 (7th
Cir. 1960) (dismissing insurer's declaratory judgment suit for nonliability because
to do otherwise would undercut state's "substantive" policy of encouraging joinder of all parties in direct action suit); cf. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d
527 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971) (filing of action in one federal
district tolls state statute of limitations in another, because federal system is a
unitary one, despite fact that courts of latter state would close their doors to
plaintiff).
237. 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 275-76; Ely, supra note 126, at
709-18; Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 381-83.
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question that one of the comparative virtues of the Hanna test is that it
tends to provide bright lines. Whatever loss will obtain because of the
use of Byrd balancing, however, can be mitigated by judicial conservatism in finding cognizable federal interests and by giving due regard to
state policies and
the policy against forum shopping and unfair judicial
2 38
administration.
Moreover the Hanna test should be rejected because it is wrong.
The test is incomplete because it excludes the possibility of recognizing
interests fundamental to our federalism. 239 In the context of an Erie
case, these interests can include important federal governmental procedural concerns as well as state substantive rights. One who ignores
such interests and the possibility of their reconciliation, in the interest
of clarity or simplicity, does so at the peril of the proper accommodation of such interests in narrow groups of cases in which they may be of

significance.
A recent Supreme Court case, PperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, 2 illustrates the difficulties applying Byrd can raise as well as the necessity for
using it. In Piper a California plaintiff, sueing on behalf of Scottish
victims of an air crash in Scotland, filed wrongful death claims in a
California state court against American manufacturers on negligence
and strict liability theories. The case was removed to federal court and
transferred to a federal forum in Pennsylvania. The defendants then
moved for dismissal for forum non conveniens, asking that the victims
be remitted to Scottish courts which would provide relief against de238. In dealing with a closely related problem, that of applying federal statutes or rules
which might override important state policies, the federal courts have followed
the lead of Provident Tradesman's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102,
118-19 (1968), and have attempted to give appropriate play to significant state
policies. Sometimes this is done by incorporating state law into the definition of
the federal rule. See, e.g., Chateau Lafayette Apartments, Inc. v. Meadow Brook
Nat'l Bank, 416 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1969) (state/local transitory action rule imbued
with state substantive policy and hence federal court must apply state standard in
determining what actions are local under federal venue law); Minichiello Realty
Assoc., Inc. v. Britt, 460 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1978) (same), aft'dper curiam, 605
F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1979); American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Hood, 37 F.R.D. 17
(E.D.S.C. 1965) (plaintiff has no right to relief, within meaning of FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a), against liability insurer when state does not permit joinder under direct
action statute). More often it is accomplished by balancing federal procedural
interests against state substantive concerns. See, e.g., Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508
F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974) (while FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) generally governs relation
back issues, it cannot shut off action when state doctrine is more liberal); Harris v.
General Coach Works, 37 F.R.D. 343 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (compensation insurer
may intervene to protect self against fraudulent claim, but in primary liability
phase of litigation no reference to its name to be permitted, out of deference to
state policy against undue jury prejudice); see also 6 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1403, 1449, 1460 (1971) (to avoid
substantive prejudice to insurers who decline to defend but fear being identified to
jury during liability phase, some courts decline to permit impleader despite FED.
R. Civ. P. 14, while the better view is simply to order severance or separate trial).
239. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 372, 384.
240. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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fendants only on negligence theories. 24 1
The district court ordered dismissal.2 42 After discounting the
plaintiff's interest in an American forum because she represented foreign interests, the judge weighed "private interest factors," suggesting
that federal trial would create unreasonable access-to-proof and joinder difficulties for the American defendants, and "public interest factors" indicating that the plaintiff's choice would impose unduly
expensive and lengthy litigation, difficult choice of law problems, and
other burdens on the federal forum.243
The Third Circuit reversed but the Supreme Court reinstated the
district court's order of dismissal. The Court's opinion, delivered by
Justice Marshall, unanimously disagreed with statements in the court
of appeals' opinion that dismissal would be inappropriate because 2' it
would result in application of law unfavorable to the plaintiff's case. "
In addition, Marshall felt that the Third Circuit's view would render
forum non conveniens useless, straight-jacket the trial judge's discretion, promote forum shopping and, at least when a foreign plaintiff
wishes to sue an American manufacturer, flood already congested
American courts. 245 Despite a brief but pointed dissent, 246 the Court
also disapproved of the court of appeals' review of the district court's
balancing analysis. 247 The Court approved the trial judge's determina-

tion to accord a foreign plaintiff's forum choice less weight than that
due American plaintiffs, because of fear that foreigners might unjustifiably seek to avail themselves of American fora and law in cases lacking
little or no American contacts.248 While admitting that the trial judge
might have overstated the case,2 49 the Court found he had not acted
241. Id at 239-41.
242. Reyno, 479 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Pa. 1979), rev'd, 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd,
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
243. 479 F. Supp. at 731-38. The judge relied on Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947) to delineate the private and public interest factors.
244. 454 U.S. at 244.
245. Id at 249-52.
246. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a one paragraph dissent. Id at
261-62 (Stevens & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). After noting the limited scope of the
writ of certiorari and concurring in the Court's disposition of that question, he
recommended remand "for further consideration of the question whether the district court correctly decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum in
which to litigate a claim against a Pennsylvania company that a plane was defectively designed and manufactured in Pennsylvania." Id at 262 (emphasis added).
Justice White also dissented from dealing with any issues beyond those presented
by the grant of certiorari. Id at 261 (White, J., dissenting). Since Justices Powell
and O'Connor did not participate in the decision, the majority's views on how to
balance the private and public interest factors represented only the position of a
minority of the full court.
247. Id at 255.
248. Id at 252, 256-57 n. 21. The Court also indicated that deference was due a plaintiff's choice to sue at home because one can reasonably assume such a decision
was based on convenience factors. Id at 255-56.
249. The Court said the district court's statement that Scotland's connections with the
case were "overwhelming" was "somewhat exaggerated." Id at 257.
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unreasonably in weighing private interest factors in favor of dismissal. 250 Conceding that the Third Circuit's choice of law analysis might
be correct, the Court nevertheless found that public interest factors also
favored dismissal.25 '
The Piper opinion is unsatisfying in many ways,252 not least in the
way it deals with issues posed by Erie and its progeny. The Court tried
to avoid these issues by asserting that the states involved had forum
253
non conveniens standards identical to those of the federal courts.
But, as the Court noted, part of the Third Circuit's argument had been
that the case should not be dismissed because to do so would undermine the deterrence policies of the states.254 Justice Marshall's opinion
does not even discuss how much weight the state courts would have
accorded a foreign plaintifis choice of forum, how heavily they would
have counted their own deterrence policies in balancing public interest
factors, or whether, if there was any evidence on the issue, the state
would have dismissed under these circumstances. If one is to balance
away substantive state policies and the policy against state-to-federal
court forum shopping, one at least ought to make such inquiries. 5
Despite these shortcomings, iper is an excellent example of the
necessity for utilizing federal common law to weigh conflicting federal
and state policies and interests. Federal judicial administration
presents uniquely federal issues and the Court's decision clearly affirms
federal competence to decide such issues, even when this implicates
matters of state concern. The opinion, by setting off against federal
administrative burdens the state deterrence policy, was engaging in a
balancing process similar to that authorized by Byrd Because of its
unsupported conclusion that the state courts would have come out the
same way, the opinion does not tell us how the Court would have re250. Id at 257-59.
251. Id at 260.
252. Although the decision has been praised for discouraging the manipulation of
American courts by foreign forum shoppers and for providing much needed protection for American industry, see Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 76 AM. J. INT'L L.
385, 396 (1982) and Note, Forum Non Conveniens. Standardsfor the Dismissalof
Actionsfrom UnitedStates FederalCourts to Foreign Tribunals, 5 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 533, 563-64 (1982), it has drawn critical comment as well. See Recent Decisions, Jurisdiction and Procedure - Forum Non Conyeniens, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 583 (1982). The comment is critical of the Court's reliance on cases
where none of the parties was American to support its conclusion that foreign
plaintiffs' choice of American fora should be given little deference, id at 594, and
argues against protectionist policies which might undermine the value of goods
and services offered for export and ultimately invite protectionist reactions. Id at
594-95 n.68.
253. 454 U.S. at 248 n.13.
254. The Third Circuit cited no state authority for the view that dismissal should be
refused if it compelled sacrifice of the state's own choice of law rule.
255. Reading the Court's language quoted at 454 U.S. at 260-61, one almost gets the
impression from the repeated references to American interests that the Court was
not mindful that, at least since Erie, there is no federal general common law, and
hence what was at stake were not American but state interests.
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solved the case had forum shopping concerns been thrown into the balance. It is hard to believe, however, that how the states would have
handled the case would be conclusive. Balancing the factors at hand,
the Court would likely have decided that federal administrative concerns still warranted dismissal. This would then force those state courts
who do not follow Piper to shoulder the administrative burdens of enforcing their own deterrence policies.
C

Refined Balancing Test and the Significance of Doing Justice

Several years ago Redish and Phillips set out to develop a "refined
balancing test" which would adequately protect federal and state interests in Erie contexts.25 6 Under their scheme, federal procedural concerns in an Erie context could be limited to "cost avoidance" interests
and "doing justice" interests.2 5 State rules might be fairly viewed as
affecting primary activity or skewing the results of lawsuits, 258 referred
to herein as substantive rules, or be characterized as having "doing justice" or "housekeeping" functions, 259 referred to herein as procedural
rules. Federal interests in avoiding costs and in doing justice should
clearly prevail, Redish and Phillips argued, only when they were set
against state procedural rules. 26 ° Under their scheme, when the federal
interest was merely one of "doing justice," it should never prevail over
a state rule implicating substantive concerns.2 6 1 Only when the federal
interests were strong cost avoidance ones would they countenance outweighing state substantive interests, and even then they indicated "reliance on the refined balancing test alone may be an inadequate method
for resolving the conflict. 2 62
The refined balancing test offered by Redish and Phillips provides
a useful framework in which to consider Byrd-balancing issues. It is,
however, seriously flawed. By their own admission, it fails in cases like
Pper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno2 63 when federal cost avoidance and state
substantive interests are both operative. Moreover, there is serious reason to question its efficacy in other settings. The problem lies in their
denigration of the federal "doing justice" interest - what they rightly
concede is the "independent system for administering justice' enunciated in Byrd "264 They relegate this to a position behind federal "cost
avoidance" concerns because the latter, being more concrete, are more
easily identifiable and predictable, and because interference with the
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 384-400.
Id. at 384-94.
Id at 394.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 390-92, 394-95, 397-99.
Id. at 392-94, 397-99.
Id at 399-400.
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 388.
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latter could be viewed as fatal to an essential federal function. 265 In

their view, the federal "doing justice" interest is insignificant because,
under Erie, "a federal diversity court has no more authority to reject
state procedure it deems unjust than it has to reject state substantive
law for the same reason; its function is not to sit in judgment
of the
266
wisdom of state rules and reject those it believes

unjust.

I disagree with part of Redish and Phillip's analysis. A federal
diversity court has no authority to reject state substantive rules because
they are deemed wrong. That was the holding of Erie. But on issues of
federal concern, including, of course, how the federal courts should operate, they do have authority to decide. That was precisely the point in
Byrd The point is perhaps best made by reference to the spate of medical malpractice screening panel cases which have recently come before
the federal courts. With one notable exception,2 67 the federal courts
265. Id at 393. The authors state that the "theoretical justification for permitting a
federal court to consider the costs created by applying certain procedures is derived from the basic notion underlying federalism that one sovereign in enforcing
rights created by another need not follow rules that would unduly burden the
performance of its essential functions." Id The word "unduly" is vaguely discordant. And, one wonders, why is cost avoidance "essential" but "doing justice"
not?
266. Id at 390 (footnote omitted).
267. Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978). There Chief Judge Pettine
declined to enforce the Rhode Island Medical Malpractice Reform Act in a federal diversity action. The state statute required, at the onset of each action in state
court, that the judge appoint a mediation panel made up of a "special master,"
attorney, and doctor selected from lists compiled respectively by the court, bar
association and medical society. The panel had the power to subpoena witnesses,
employ its own expert, and render findings on the issues of liability and damages.
Absent timely objection, the findings were conclusive. If there was objection, the
civil action continued, and there would be a full dress trial de novo of all issues in
the court. The statute provided for the admissibility of the panel's conclusions on
the issue of liability. Id at 219. Though recognizing the state statute was substantive and that failure to enforce it would encourage forum shopping and inequitable administration of the laws, id at 227-28, Chief Judge Pettine nevertheless
declined to enforce it for several reasons. First, he distinguished other statutes
which made referral to a panel a condition precedent to beginning an action by
noting that here the panel was appointed after the filing of an action and hence
was really nothing more than an adjunct of the state court. Id at 22 1. He balked
at making a federal diversity court go on bended knee to a state panel before it
could proceed with its own docket, saying that the statute:
denies the federal court initial jurisdiction. The first trial of the action
for all practical purposes occurs before a state tribunal according to state
rules of evidence and procedure. With respect to both settlement and
the subsequent jury verdict, the hearing before the panel is likely to be
the decisive battle between the litigants.

.

.

. The danger of local bias

is particularly real when the reviewing panel is not composed of judges
who are selected for, sworn to and practiced in impartiality.
Id at 222-23. Chief Judge Pettine declined to create a federal panel because to do
so would "strongly influence the [subsequent] jury verdict or circumvent jury trial
altogether" in ways inconsistent with federal jury values, id at 225-26, and would
permit "the state . . . unilaterally [to] thrust . . . substantial, added inconven-

ience and cost onto the federal system" in ways inconsistent with the federal judi-
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have upheld the operation of these statutes.2 68 As the judges themselves recognized, the purposes of these statutes were plain: not simply
to relieve state courts of the burdens of more litigation and help their
juries reach "juster" verdicts, but more particularly to do this to the
benefit of health care providers and their insurers by promoting prompt
settlement of all but the more egregious claims and cutting down the
size of presumptively overgenerous jury verdicts. 26 9 The goals of these
state statutes are inherently "substantive. ' 270 Unfortunately, but preciary's interest in avoiding cost, delay, and unnecessary lack of uniformity in
federal procedure. Id at 228-29.
268. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880 (lst Cir. 1981);
Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); Edelson v.
Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164
(5th Cir. 1979); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421 (N.D. Ind. ), aff'd,
603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Wells v. McCarthy, 432 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Mo.
1977); Flotemersch v. Bedford County Gen. Hosp., 69 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Tenn.
1975). Judge Pettine in Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218 (D.R.I. 1978), distinguished his case from those where filing with a malpractice panel is a condition
precedent to the right of action, citing the Flotemersch case. Id at 221. The Fifth
Circuit accepted this distinction in Holy Cross and decided to follow Flotemersch,
since the statute it was dealing with (Florida's) was more similar to the Tennessee
statute than the Rhode Island one. See 591 F.2d at 1169 n.7. The Edelson panel
rejected the distinction and went on to reject Wheeler. 610 F.2d at 137 n.8.
Wheeler's continuing vitality, even on its own facts, is further questionable in
light of the First Circuit's implicit rejection of it in Feinstein. 643 F.2d at 887-89.
269. See Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 399. Professor Redish himself has written on the malpractice panel legislation. See Redish, Legislative Response to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis.- Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L.
REv. 759 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Legislative Response].
270. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 227 (D.R.I. 1978); Legislative
Response, supra note 269, at 766-67; Redish & Phillips, supra note 154, at 400
n.231; Symposium, The 1975 Indiana Act in Context, 51 IND. L.J. 91, 93 (1975).
As these authorities suggest, the explosion of claims and high verdicts which emanated from our courts in the early 1970's is what led lobbyists for the doctors,
hospitals, and insurance companies to urge these statutes upon the legislatures.
They argued that the statutes would relieve court congestion by promoting settlement of sham claims as well as those which were egregious, and would assist
juries in reaching more "accurate" decisions, by giving them the benefit of the
conclusion of a "neutral" arbitration panel on the "difficult" issues presented by
the cases. But the goals were not simply procedural. The air was full of stories of
sham claims and runaway verdicts, and the desire was to cut the risks to the doctors, hospitals, and insurers and thereby cut overall health care costs. As a gesture
to needy plaintiffs, the statutes also frequently provided that the experts who were
called before the panels be made available to the winning party.
Some of the statutes facially suggest a narrower procedural basis, masking
the enforced arbitration panel's function in language that going to the panel is a
mere "condition precedent" or "precondition" to a full dress trial de novo. This
may be good public relations, and certainly has frequently succeeded in insulating
the statutes from attacks under state and federal jury trial guarantees. See, e.g.,
Feinstein v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 634 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1981); Carter v.
Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Nev. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). But see Wright v. General
DuPage Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976). But, as the Wheeler
court noted, it is hard to believe most juries will resist the conclusions of "a courtappointed panel of esteemed professionals who have reviewed all the evidence,"
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dictably,2 7 the procedural barriers they erected resulted in gross
overkill of the plaintiffs' legitimate interests; in one instance delays so
frustrated the ultimate access to court that a state supreme court was
forced to strike down the statute.2 72 A year earlier, the Third Circuit
had ignored the same situation and enforced the state rule in federal
court. 7 3 While there are numerous objections to the Third Circuit's
decision,2 74 the most fundamental one cannot be that it did not result in
"cost avoidance"; after all, however one works it out, the costs of no
litigation are considerably less than the costs of some. 275 The real ob78 F.R.D. at 226, especially when one remembers that their conclusions will be

allowed into court without oath or cross-examination.
271. Cf. Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation - A First Checkup, 50
TUL. L. REV. 655 (1976) indicating surprise that "[i]n fact, the review panel pro-

ceedings actually delay suits and add to the expense of any case that goes to trial."
Id at 681. Why this came as a surprise, in view of the interests of the progenitors
of the malpractice legislation, is the only thing which surprises this writer.

272. See Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 106, 421 A.2d 190 (1980). The Mattos court
said the act placed such onerous and impossible conditions on the right to jury
trial and access to courts as to offend two provisions of the state constitution. The
court found that from its inauguration in April 1976 until May 31, 1980, only 27 %
of the claims filed with the Pennsylvania Arbitration Panel for Health Care had
been processed in any way. The court concluded that: "Such delays are unconscionable and irreparably rip the fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and
effectiveness of our judicial system. Most importantly, these statistics amply

demonstrate that 'the legislative scheme is incapable of achieving its stated purpose.'" Id at 109, 421 A.2d at 195 (quoting Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106, 121, 394 A.2d 932, 940 (1978)).
273. See Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979). The majority conceded that
it confronted "an ambitious state program in which the deed has fallen woefully
short of the promise," id at 136, and later labeled the arbitration system "a
resounding flop." Id But, it said, the state interests "expounded by its legislature" in cutting insurance premiums and promptly resolving malpractice claims

outweighed Byrd- like countervailing federal considerations involving reasonably
speedy and inexpensive access to trial and fair jury consideration of the claim,

because "federal plaintiffs are entitled to no better treatment than state plaintiffs
.
" In addition, the admission of the panel's findings would not "predispose
the jury and thus usurp its fact finding power.

.

." any more than normal expert

testimony would and because, in any event, the court believed Byrd should not be
applied in light of the the continued vitality of the outcome determination analysis of Guaranty Trust. Id at 139-40.

These arguments are patently specious. As Judge Rosenn in dissent pointed
out, the plaintiffs were noncitizens of Pennsylvania, so that relegating them to the
state legislature with complaints about access to court is the last thing the court
majority should have mandated. Id at 142 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). The analogy
of the panel's findings to the testimony of an expert who is subject to cross examination is fatally flawed, and the resurrection of outcome analysis after Byrd and
Hanna seems a bit out of date.
274. For example, unless one is willing to render the federal hearsay rule completely
ineffectual, one could easily recognize that the panel's findings would be wholly
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 801, 802.
If this is true, then the defanged panel would be, even for state purposes, a waste
of time.
275. One could argue that Pennsylvania did not want plaintiffs to have a judicial forum. There is no question that the effect of the short-lived Pennsylvania procedure was virtually to abolish the cause of action of medical malpractice in that
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jection to the state rule has to do with "doing justice," and a federal
court should have held the state rules incompatible with the federal
court's interest in doing justice in a reasonable way.2 76
In many contexts cost avoidance and doing justice concerns are
mixed. Consider federal cases suggesting that the filing of a class action in federal court tolls the running of the statute of limitations
against putative class members and permits them to sue after the court
has declined to certify the action as a class action.2 77 American Pipe &
Construction Co. v. Utah 278 rejected the contrary rule as both unfair to
those who might have relied on their representation by the class action

plaintiff and as inhibiting judicial economy by encouraging putative
class members to file intervention motions.27 9 While American Pipe
grounded its holding on policies implicit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court acknowledged that nothing on the face of rule 23
specifically required its holding and indeed referred to its holding as
"judicial tolling" of the statute through choice
of "the rule most consis280
tent with federal class action procedure."
None of the cases following American Ppe specifically presented
an Erie-Byrd issue because they involved federal causes of action.2 8 '
There is reason to believe, however, that the nature of the causes are
"accidental features" of the cases28 2 and that "the rule of tolling
adopted. . . was an equitable incident of federal procedure. ' 283 If so,
federal courts considering the impact of rejected class certifications
brought under diversity jurisdiction would have power to choose to disregard state cases declining to toll their statutes of limitations in com-

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

282.
283.

state, and doubtless at least the insurance companies and doctors were happy with
the result. If the state really set out to abolish the cause of action, whether or not
at the behest of the insurance and medical lobbies, Erie would command the federal courts to respect that decision. But none of the opinions in Edelson v.
Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979), even remotely suggest that abolition was the
goal, and if there is any doubt on the issue it is now laid to rest by Mattos v.
Thompson, 491 Pa. 106, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
Chardon v. Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 103 S.
Ct. 2392 (1983); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
Id at 553.
Id at 554.
American Pipe involved federal antitrust claims and statutes of limitations and
Chardon v. Soto, 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983), involved the civil rights statute which, via
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), mandates borrowing state statutes of limitations and tolling rules unless they are "inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United
States."
Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 1982), Pacatedand remanded, 103 S.
Ct. 3529 (1983).
Id Pavlak limited these statements to federal question cases generally, but in
support of its view that statutes of limitations might be suspended in favor of
federal policy cited Hanna and Byrd. American Pipe, the leading case today, relied in part on earlier court of appeals cases including, interestingly, York v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S.
99 (1945). See American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 549 n.18, 551 n.21.
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parable circumstances.284
Chardon v. Soto 285 suggests an added dimension to the American
Pipe problem. In Chardon, the issue was whether the statute of limitations should merely be suspended during the pendency of the class action, as suggested by American Pipe, or begin to run anew as local law
would require. 286 Since applying the local rule would not conflict with
any of the procedural policies of American Pipe, the court decided to
apply it. 287 In dissent, Justice Rehnquist found the Chardon holding

anomolous in view of his certainty that, had the state rule totally prohibited tolling, theAmerican Pipe rule would still have been applied. 8 8
The anomaly is only superficial, however, if one accepts the notion that
in certain areas there is only limited need for federal uniformity and
that once the need has been satisfied it is perfectly appropriate to consider the content of various rules of law before exercising choice.289
V. CONCLUSION
Proper understanding of the relationship between the new federal
common law and the Erie doctrine provides indirect but compelling
support for the view that it is appropriate to take seriously the doing
justice function of the federal courts and to, on occasion, override state
rules which interfere with the function. More generally, it justifies
greater federal willingness to employ federal procedures in those contexts when the primary opposing concern is avoidance of forum shopping. Erie did not abolish all federal common law, but only that which
was "general." Pre-Erie cases involving admiralty, bankruptcy, and interstate disputes, and post-Erie cases like Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
29
States290 and Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, '

warrant the conclusion that in certain cases there is both federal judicial power to adopt federal substantive rules and, in a proper case, to
have these rules preempt the operation of conflicting local law. The
factors used by federal courts in answering such questions include the
extent to which there is a body of federal positive law in the background which warrants but does not compel the adoption of a federal
rule, the nature and significance of the federal interests involved, and
the nature and significance of countervailing state interests that adoption of a uniform federal rule would impinge upon.
284. Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977) (state statutes of limitations do not apply to EEOC actions enforcing Title VII claims because inconsistent with Title VII's substantive policies); see also Lincoln Mills, discussed supra at
notes 75-96.
285. 103 S. Ct. 2611 (1983).
286. Id at 2614.
287. Id 2619.
288. Id at 2621-22 (Rehnquist, Powell, & White, J.J., dissenting).
289. See supra note 234.
290. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).

291. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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Use of federal common law as a basis for preempting the operation of state law in the service of federal procedural interests is not
inconsistent with the new federal common law, but merely a predictable, entirely congruent, extension of its principles. The Erie-Byrd doctrine thus becomes but a branch of the larger corpus of federal common
law aimed at resolving conflicts between federal and state policies. In
Byrd, of course, the positive law background which influenced but did
not command the operation of federal common law was procedural the seventh amendment and the body of legislation establishing the
federal courts. The federal interest was not substantive but procedural
- the carrying out of constitutional and congressional mandates to
have the federal courts operate as independent agencies for administering justice. But here, as there, sound constitutionalism must imply
recognition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law or "judicial legislation," rules which may
be necessary to . . .effectuate the statutory patterns enacted
in the large by Congress. In other words, it must mean recognition of federal judicial competence to declare the governing
law. . . apposite to any issue bearing a substantial relation to
an established national government function .... 292
Byrd's federal common law is not some illegitimate "ghost of Swif...
still walking abroad .
-2. Instead, it is an entirely legitimate correlative of the doctrine of Clearfeld Trust and Lincoln Mills, their antecedents and progeny.

292. Mishkin, supra note 5, at 800-01.
293. Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 761 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650
(1940).

